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# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1095



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## INTERNATIONAL

### PRC'S ANTI-SOCIALIST STAND CONDEMNED

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 22, Nov 80 signed to press 11 Nov 80 pp 73-78

[Article by O. Borisov: "The Unity of the Socialist Countries and Its Beijing Opponents"]

[Excerpts] Questions of the development and strengthening of the Soviet Union's relations with other states of the world socialist system occupy top priority in the international affairs of our country and party. The importance of this work is determined by the transforming influence which world socialism exerts on the solution of the basic problems of our modern times.

The growth of the influence of the world socialist system is evident above all in the fact that it has succeeded in seriously limiting the aggressive but feeble efforts of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism, as well as in achieving a steady strengthening of socialism's positions.

The anniversary conference of the PPK (Political Consultative Committee) in Warsaw, the meetings in the Crimea, the speeches of leaders of the fraternal parties and states have thoroughly analyzed the reasons for the turning in the policy of the United States and the capitalist West as a whole away from detente and to an exacerbation of international tension. The principal one of these reasons consists of the attempt by world imperialism to hinder the consolidation of socialism's positions and the successes of the peoples' national liberation struggle, as well as the increased influence of the democratic progressive forces. This is an attempt to break up the course of events for its own advantage, with the aid of force to halt, or at least to retard, the progress of historical changes. The exacerbation of the international situation has been caused not by the "Soviet threat," but by the aggressive policy of Washington and the NATO circles.

In contrast, the foreign policy of the countries belonging to the socialist community is aimed at advancing the lessening of tensions, at ensuring a genuine transition from the arms race to disarmament, and at achieving an equitable political regulation of conflict situations in various zones in the world.

Imperialism and international reaction, forces hostile to socialism, are striving in all manner of ways to undermine the solidarity of the socialist states, to split them up, and to set them against each other. It is precisely in this direction that nationalism is exerting its disuniting influence, and subversive activity is being conducted by the imperialists and the Beijing hegemonists who are acting in concert with them.

The provocative activity of the Chinese leadership, aimed at disrupting détente, closing up the gap with imperialism, and subverting the unity of the socialist countries, represents a growing danger for all mankind.

The military ties between the imperialists and Beijing are being expanded. In May--June 1980 a journey to the United States was undertaken by a high-ranking Chinese military delegation, headed up by Politburo member, Chief of the Secretariat of the Military Council of the CPC (Communist Party of China) Central Committee, Geng Biao, accompanied by a large group of army specialists.

Somewhat earlier, in January 1980, China was visited by the US Secretary of Defense, H. Brown. During the course of similar visits a platform of joint and parallel actions has been worked out against world socialism, détente and peace. In Beijing Brown threatened that if anyone violated the interests of the United States and China, the latter two powers might respond with "mutually supplementary acts not only in the field of diplomacy but in the field of defense, for the sake of protecting both our mutual interests." In essence, such a joint aggressive activity, or to be more exact, an undeclared war, is now being conducted by the Maoists together with the Americans against Afghanistan.

Beijing's goals with regard to the socialist states remain as before--to attempt to split up the unity of the fraternal countries, to cause mutual friction among them, to set them against the Soviet Union, to destroy their harmonious actions in the international arena, and, in the final analysis, to subordinate them to its own influence.

The Chinese leadership is intensifying its hostility toward the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, Laos, and other countries. In its approach to the peoples of Indochina its hegemonism is manifested with particular clarity, along with its striving to bind them by force to its own will. Chinese armed provocations have not ceased on the border of the SRV (Socialist Republic of Vietnam). There is continued subversive activity by the Beijing rulers against Laos, and they are providing military and political support to the unsubdued detachments of the Pol Pot forces in Kampuchea. The tension in Southeast Asia "is being created primarily by the expansionist policy of Beijing, which is enjoying the support of the United States," L. I. Brezhnev stated in the communique at the meeting in the Crimea with Kayson Phomvihanh. "It is precisely Beijing which is attempting in all manner of ways to complicate the situation within the countries of Indochina, to interfere in their internal affairs, and to

inspire provocations by the opponents of socialism and progress. China has not even stopped using crude pressure on the ruling circles of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nation) countries, in particular, Thailand, in the hope of subordinating them to its own demands. In condemning China's hegemonist policy, the Soviet Union and Laos advocate the normalization of the situation in Southeast Asia and throughout the entire Asian continent."

In regard to the Mongolian People's Republic, China, as before, is conducting an expansionist policy; it is exerting military-political and economic pressure, and it is carrying out ideological diversions. A particular effort is being made here to falsify the history of Mongolia and the Mongol nation.

For many years now the Chinese leaders have been playing a double game with regard to the Korean question. In fact they advocate the maintaining of American troops in South Korea, although with their words they support the calls of the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) for the removal of these troops.

The Chinese tactics in its approach to the European socialist countries are also double-dealing.

At a press conference in Beijing on 7 October 1979 Hua Guofeng actually came out on the side of the West German revanchists who are demanding the "reunification of Germany" by means of the annexation of the GDR by the FRG.

At the present time, when imperialist circles in the West are striving to utilize the events in Poland for anti-socialist provocative purposes, the Beijing propaganda is distorting the essence of the events which are occurring, and is attempting to discredit the course being followed by the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party) to stabilize the situation within the country.

In elucidating the life of the socialist countries, Chinese propaganda is making more and more use of the devices of bourgeois mass information media. They are fabricating all sorts of inventions about some kind of "contradictions" between the ruling parties and the laboring masses; they are crudely falsifying the nature of the relations among the socialist states.

Beijing declares that it advocates the development of intergovernmental relations with the socialist countries and it is striving "for friendly relations" with them, while maintaining and intensifying, moreover, the anti-Soviet thrust of its own political course. Under these conditions it is particularly important for the fraternal countries to coordinate their actions with regard to China; to a considerable extent, this is neutralizing the negative influence of Beijing's "differentiation" policy.

The Chinese leaders have intensified their efforts to subvert the communist movement from within, to introduce a split in its ranks, to weaken the positions of the parties which advocate Marxist-Leninist viewpoints. These goals are being served, in particular, by the restoration and deepening of Beijing's ties with individual Communist Parties with which it had previously had serious differences, and by the revival of a practice, which had been interrupted during the "cultural revolution," of sending CPC delegations to the congresses of certain parties.

These facts also testify to the revival of a pro-Maoist opportunism toward which Beijing is moving. A danger is being created of the rise of a general, "Euro-Asiatic," opportunistic platform, the basis of which would consist of nationalism, elements of "Eurocommunism," and a modified Maoism.

The modification of Maoism constitutes one of the important characteristics of the present-day position within China. Its unique manifestation has been the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, the decision on which was approved by the Plenum of the CPC Central Committee in February 1980. It is well known that in 1968 the decree on the expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the CPC and his removal from all posts "inside and outside of the party" was adopted by the Plenum of the CPC Central Committee upon the report of Zhou Enlai. At that time Zhou Enlai called Liu the "chief of the bourgeois staff," "a traitor," "a provocateur," and "a strikebreaker."

Evidently, Liu Shaoqi really did have differences with Mao Zedong over domestic and foreign questions, although it was precisely he in a report at the 7th Congress of the CPC in 1945 who provided grounds for the rightness of the "Chinese-ation of Marxism," and it was he who put into circulation the term "thoughts of Mao Zedong."

On 17 May 1980 a funeral service was held in China, devoted to the memory of Liu Shaoqi. A whole series of articles was published about him in the press. It is curiously interesting that the authors of these materials tried in all manner of ways to remove from Mao Zedong the blame for the repressions against Liu Shaoqi, although this is in blatant contradiction with the facts.

Judging by all the evidence, the campaign to rehabilitate Liu Shaoqi was managed by Deng Xiaoping and his faction. But will this be for long? One can assert with considerable confidence that in the course of the factional struggle in China one "gang" after another will appear. The elimination from the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee at the Fifth Plenum of the "new four" (Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Chen Xilian, and Wu De), the open criticism which has been levelled at certain adherents of the "cultural revolution," and Deng Xiaoping's attempts to crowd out Hua Guofeng all serve to clearly affirm this point.

An important place in the struggle of Deng Xiaoping's faction for a further expansion of their positions in the party leadership, as well as that of the



army and the government on the eve of the 12th Congress of the CPC was devoted to the court trials in the case of the Lin Biao group and the "gang of four," headed by Mao's widow--Jiang Qing.

This juridical farce was called upon to present the accused as the only guilty ones for the enormous damage which was inflicted on the country by Mao Zedong's policy and, at the same time, to exculpate the chief elements to blame for the misfortunes and tragedies of the Chinese people--Mao and Maoism, while the present-day Beijing leaders are presented as the champions of justice.

If we speak about the situation in the PRC as a whole, we should emphasize that the root problems of socioeconomic development, despite certain changes in the life of the country, remain unresolved; the consequences of the political crisis in Chinese society have not been overcome. The Beijing leadership is modifying Maoism and applying it to the requirements of the "four modernizations" for the purpose of transforming the PRC into a powerful militaristic state.

The complex economic and political situation in the country, the struggle within the leadership, and the attempts by the Beijing leaders to find a way out of the critical situation were reflected in concentrated form in the work of the Third Session of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives (VSNP), Fifth Convocation (30 August--10 September 1980). Having acknowledged the failure of the previously proclaimed plans for carrying out the "four modernizations," this session examined the questions of putting the economy in order, reform of the system for managing it, and it carried out major personnel reforms in the state leadership of the PRC. A new economic policy was proclaimed at this session; it will be oriented at the restoration and prolonged co-existence of economic systems which will be diverse in their socioeconomic nature: state, cooperative, private, and state-capitalist. A course was set for the abrupt narrowing of the sphere of centralized state planning and financing. Preference will be given to the market regulation of the economy and a widespread introduction of the principles of competition.

The activation of the private-ownership element, the active seeking out of foreign capital, and the intensification of political and social differentiation within the society all conceal within themselves a danger of China's further shift to the right and a further closing of the gap between China and imperialism, as well as a deepening of the pro-imperialistic orientation in foreign policy.

The session confirmed the personnel changes, in particular, the removal of Hua Guofeng from the post of premier of the PRC State Council and seven other leading figures of the CPC, including Deng Xiaoping, from the posts of deputies to the premier of the PRC State Council. The newly appointed premier of the State Council, Zhao Ziyang, and his deputies are closely linked in their political orientation with the right-wing, pragmatic...

group of Deng Xiaoping and his course toward further rapprochement with the West.

The session of the VSNP demonstrated the extreme complexity of the problems confronting the country and the solution of which requires a prolonged time period and considerable material outlays. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated the presence of a yawning gap between the declarations of the Chinese leadership and its practical deeds. While speaking of the desire to "increase the people's well-being," the Chinese leaders, nevertheless, are subordinating economic and political decisions primarily to the tasks of stepping up the country's militarization.

As admitted by the Chinese leaders themselves, the reforms in the fields of the economy and the political system which were outlined by the VSNP have engendered new and extremely complex political, economic and social problems. Around these problems and the ways to solve them a fierce struggle is raging within the Chinese leadership, and it is growing more intense as the 12th Congress of the CPC approaches. It is aggravating the political instability in the country.

The retreat from certain extremes of the "cultural revolution," the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi and other CPC figures who became victims of the Maoist arbitrary rule, the actual break with a number of the most absurd positions of Mao Zedong--all this is deserving of attention. Nevertheless, the new factors in the Beijing line have not affected the main thing--its anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, aggressive course in the world arena. Both in the speech of the Chairman of the PRC Central Committee, Hua Guofeng, and in the official declarations of the new Premier of the PRC State Council, Zhao Ziyang, anti-Sovietism in the field of China's foreign policy has advanced to the forefront.

The regulation of sociopolitical and economic life in China is bound up with the struggle against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. The maneuvering of the present-day Beijing leadership is proceeding on the basis of the fundamental postulates of Maoism and does not testify to a return of the country to the path of a genuinely socialist development.

Soviet-Chinese relations are characterized now as before by tension. In delivering the principal report before the high staff group of the CPC Central Committee and the PRC State Council, Deng Xiaoping declared on 16 January 1980 that the struggle against the Soviet Union on a global scale "is the principal task of China in the field of foreign policy." A new high tide of anti-Sovietism in Beijing's policies and propaganda has continued in connection with the events in Afghanistan. Throughout all of 1979 and in 1980 the Beijing leaders have exacerbated Soviet-Chinese relations, demonstrating a vivid lack of interest in the normalization of ties between the two countries. This was testified to by the decision of the PRC government not to extend the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid,

which expired on 11 April 1980. This was also revealed by the de facto refusal by Beijing to accept the Soviet Union's proposal to sign instead of the treaty a joint document on the principles of reciprocal relations between the two states, based on peaceful co-existence. This was very clearly demonstrated by the course of negotiations in Moscow on the questions of intergovernmental relations during the autumn of 1979. Our proposal as set forth on 7 April 1980 in the newspaper PRAVDA, to continue the negotiations did not meet with a positive response in Beijing.

The Chinese leaders have closed the gap with Washington with regard to the question of so-called "sanctions." They have postponed for an indefinite time the Beijing round of Soviet-Chinese negotiations on intergovernmental relations; they also refused to allow the PRC to participate in the Moscow Olympic Games.

China is completely at one with the United States in the instigation of anti-Soviet hysteria: RENMIN RIBAO alone every month publishes hundreds of articles crudely slandering the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union. We may say that in the policy of the Chinese leadership, the principal tendency of which is the partnership with the aggressive circles of imperialism, a new phase has been marked:

- it is linked with the activation of the joint and parallel acts of the PRC and the imperialist states in the international arena, which are regarded by them from the point of view of a long-term strategy;

- the hegemonist course of Beijing (moreover, also world hegemonism as a whole) receives additional material support by way of strengthening the regime in the PRC and by a forced development with the aid of imperialism of its economic and military potential, including modern types of weapons;

- an important place in these processes may be occupied by a serious adjustment in Beijing's domestic policy, which is oriented toward a further retreat from socialist principles of economic management and the creation of a multi-structured, "mixed" economy, the use of "market regulation" in the economic mechanism, and the attraction of foreign capital. All this conceals a danger of China's shifting to the right, and it creates additional factors of Beijing's rapprochement with the capitalist world;

- the framework of the "very broad front" against the USSR and its allies is to be extended by means of drawing into it nationalistic and opportunistic elements from the revolutionary and democratic movements;

- an intensive modernization of Maoism is taking place in such a way that it will be responsive to Beijing's present-day tasks and become a more attractive doctrine for imperialism and also for right-wing opportunism.



The present situation indicates that under the conditions of a worsening struggle between the socialist and capitalist world systems China's importance as a negative factor in international politics will increase. There will be an increase in its role as a toady of imperialism in the struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and against detente. A real danger will arise that Beijing, in case of a further deepening of the confrontation between the two systems "will not sit on the hill, watching the fight between the two tigers," but will most likely turn out to be on the side of the imperialists.

The best means to prevent anything surprising or unexpected from the Beijing leadership and to curb Chinese expansionism consists of the firm principled position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, along with a high degree of vigilance by the peoples of the fraternal countries and their constant readiness to rebuff any untoward adventures by the Chinese chauvinists.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION, WORKING CLASS

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 80  
signed to press 4 Sep 80 pp 104-111

[Article by S. M. Aliyev, candidate in history and scholarly staff member of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 and the Working Class"]

[Text] The anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist revolution of 1978-1979 marked an extremely important milestone in the sociopolitical history of modern Iran.

The social base of the mass opposition outbreaks during the initial period of the Iranian revolution--the first half of 1978--consisted of the "traditional" urban middle classes (artisans, craftsmen, petty traders, owners of small-scale workshops, and so forth); linked with them was a stratum of workers; also paupers--the greater part of whom were recently peasants and farm-workers--and, finally, a portion of the students and secondary-school pupils. In August--October 1978 the revolutionary movement was actively joined by the industrial proletariat, office workers, students, intellectuals, and somewhat later by some peasants.

Because of a number of circumstances the Iranian proletariat could not become the predominant force in this genuinely popular revolution. This characteristic, however, can in no way serve as a reason for belittling the role of Iranian workers in the revolutionary events of 1978--1979. As will be shown below, without the active participation of the proletariat the victory of the anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist revolution would have been inconceivable. The inclusion of the Iranian proletariat during the autumn of 1978 in the opposition movement, along with its self-sacrificing and implacable struggle against the shah's authorities, played a significant role in altering the balance of forces in favor of the revolution.

The present article examines the principal aspects of the labor question in Iran. An attempt has been made to reveal the class essence of the policy of the shah's authorities with regard to the working class and to disclose the importance of the proletariat's struggle in the overthrow of the shah's regime and in the movement to democratize sociopolitical life in the country during the period after the February 1979 armed uprising.

During the course of the 1960s and 1970s Iran became one of those developing countries in whose financial and economic position there occurred notable positive changes. Since the mid-1960s Iran's economy developed at a rapid pace. By the mid-1970s, as a result of increased revenues from petroleum exports,<sup>1</sup> the country entered into a period of a financial and economic boom; by virtue of the anti-popular and pro-Western policy of the shah's regime, this had a diverse and, to a large extent, negative influence on the state of the Iranian economy. And, on the whole, the significant increase in state revenues, the reforms carried out by the shah's court, and the course of expanding industrial construction led, especially beginning in the mid-1960s, to an accelerated development in the breadth and depth of capitalist relations.

In the mid-1960s industrialization had become a significant economic and social factor facilitating in particular also the expansion of civil construction and speeding up the process of urbanization. As a result, of agrarian reforms, albeit private ones, there was a considerable growth in the number of peasants who own their own farms and agricultural workers; the civil and industrial construction led to an increase in the number of the working class. At the same time, as a result of the change in the sectorial structure of industry, the appearance of new sectors linked with the use of up-to-date technology and equipment, there was an ongoing process of forming new detachments of the industrial proletariat, and this constituted one of the important aspects of the social shifts which were occurring in the country.

Iranian statistics do not provide sufficient material for a more or less exact enumeration of the working class as a whole and its individual categories, in particular, its structure and degree of concentration. Nevertheless, based on an analysis and an enumeration of the data which we do have, in principle we may obtain some necessary information concerning the working class of present-day Iran.

Iran's present-day working class includes the following four basic groups: 1) the industrial proletariat (factory-plant workers, miners, including oil workers), transport workers, communications workers, and others; 2) construction workers; 3) farm workers; 4) workers engaged in the fields of trade and service, as well as in handicraft enterprises.

By the mid-1970s the total number of the working class, according to certain estimates, had reached 3 million persons,<sup>2</sup> which comprised about 30--33 percent of the self-supporting and 9 percent of the entire population of Iran. The industrial proletariat was transformed into the main, leading detachment of Iran's present-day working class. In 1976 the total number of hired workers in the manufacturing and extraction industries amounted to

million persons. Medium-sized and large-scale enterprises (in Iran these are considered to be enterprises employing more than 10 persons) employed approximately 450,000 persons, that is, about 24 percent of all employees.)

The largest number of workers was concentrated in enterprises of the textile, food, mining, petroleum, chemical, metallurgical, and electrical engineering industries. A high degree of manpower concentration became characteristic for enterprises of such sectors as oil-refining, petrochemical, metallurgical, electrical engineering, automobile-manufacturing, and others.

By the mid-1970s quite a significant portion of the Iranian proletariat was made up of construction workers. If in 1963 their number equalled 314,000 persons, by 1976 it was about 1.2 million. A considerable number of hired workers were concentrated in the service field. By 1976 they comprised more than 25 percent of all employees. The regions where the basic mass of workers was concentrated included, primarily, Tehran and the entire Central province, as well as the provinces of Isfahan, Khuzistan, and Eastern Azerbaijan. A characteristic trait of the development of Iran's working class during the 1960s and 1970s has been the increase in the women's stratum. By the mid-1970s approximately 20 percent of the industrial workers were women. Despite the considerable increase in the size of the working class, the skills level of the proletariat remained quite low in general.

The most important source for filling out the ranks of Iran's working class consists of peasants and the inhabitants of the smaller cities who have migrated into the country's industrial centers. Every year about 300,000 persons have migrated into the cities, of which more than 25 percent have poured into the capital--Tehran. Even under conditions of a construction boom and an expansion in the scope of industrialization the large Iranian cities, and in particular Tehran, which by the mid-1970s was inhabited by about 5 million persons, were not capable of absorbing this ever-increasing mass of migrants. The number of unemployed also increased because of demographic factors. As a result, during the 1970s a numerically significant stratum of paupers and semi-proletarians took shape in the country, and this led directly to an increase in social tensions.

The material status of most Iranian workers under the shah's regime, even under conditions of the financial boom, remained difficult. From 1962/63 through 1966/67 the real wages of Iranian workers according to official data, increased by 10 percent, and from 1966/67 through 1971/72 they increased by 37 percent. By the mid-1970s wages had grown by another 56 percent. These data, however, which were published by government organizations, were compiled on the basis of large-scale industrial enterprises, and this does not allow us to reconstitute a true picture of real wage dynamics of the principal categories of Iranian workers, who are employed in small-scale enterprises. Nevertheless, even these official, inflated figures testify that the increase in wages did not provide the necessary subsistence minimum for a family of four persons, as established by the authorities.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, we should keep in mind that the families of Iranian workers usually consist of more members than this.



During the years which preceded the revolution of 1978-1979 the prices of land and housing grew constantly. In 1977 the average price of the most modest one-room apartment amounted to 1,600,000 rials. It is not surprising, therefore, that more than 90 percent of the industrial workers did not possess their own housing. And apartment rents also grew unrestrainedly. Housing rents cost workers and office clerks 50--75 percent of their wages.

If the process of industrialization and especially the financial and economic boom stimulated the rise in the level of the wages of workers and certain other low-paid social groups, then the inflation, which intensified since 1975/76, and the ensuing sharp rise in prices on the domestic market, along with the unrestrained rise in apartment rents (during the years 1966--1976 they increased 15-fold) severely affected the interests of workers and office clerks, as well as those of other low-paid strata. Symptoms of political and social ferment began to appear. For the first time since the reform policy had begun to be implemented strikes took place at a number of industrial enterprises; their participants demanded an improvement in their economic and social status.

Anti-imperialism, particularly anti-Americanism, which had become an inextricable trait of the Iranian revolution, took on even more significant scope. The interrelationship between these phenomena--the exacerbation of the domestic political struggle and the intensification of the Iranian-American crisis--is profound in nature.

\* \* \*

Taking into consideration the fact that, with the expansion of industrial construction and as a result of urbanization, the proportion of the proletariat had increased, Iran's ruling circles during the 1960's ascribed greater importance to conducting a policy aimed at maintaining and deepening its influence on the workers. With this goal in mind the ruling upper circle developed an entire complex of measures which were political, economic, and social in their nature. Furthermore, prior to the autumn of 1978 this complex of measures was carried out under conditions whereby authoritarian methods of governing the country assumed a more and more persistent character. A special place in the labor policy of the shah's regime was allotted to economic and sociopolitical reforms which were intended by means of insignificant reforms to prevent an intensification of the conflicts between labor and capital. At the same time, the government implemented a policy directed at establishing complete control over the activities of all labor organizations, and by means of social demagoguery it strove to inculcate a spirit of reformism in the proletariat.

The shah's regime devoted a great deal of attention to the political and ideological treatment of the workers. A special place in this plan was allocated to the complete nationalization of the labor and trade-union organizations. The Organization of Iranian Workers (OIW), which was created from above, appeared in 1967. It combined the three previously existing pro-government trade-union organizations of Tehran. Under the aegis of the

government the OIW leadership in March 1968 convoked the First Congress of the Workers of Iran. Its work was guided by the leaders of the Irane novin (New Iran) Party, which constituted the de facto political organization of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This Congress adopted a resolution providing for the merger within the OIW framework of all trade-union and labor organizations belonging to the government and the Irane novin Party respectively.<sup>5</sup>

Prior to the spring of 1975 in Iran, besides the Irane novin government party, two more parties were functioning: the Mardom Loyal Opposition Party and the small Pan-Iranist Party. Intending to place the country's entire political and social life under his own control, the shah decided in the spring of 1975 to move to a one-party system. He regarded even the loyal opposition of the Mardom Party as a certain danger for his own authoritarian regime. The new party, whose leaders included persons from the three dissolved parties, and primarily those from the governmental Irane novin, was named Khezbe rastakhize mellate Iran (Iranian People's Rebirth Party).

The new party, whose leaders and activists were made up of the same bureaucratic bourgeoisie, developed its activities under the direct leadership of the shah, who was proclaimed in its program as the "commander" ("farmandekh") and "leader of the nation" ("rakhbare mellat"). The fundamental ideological and political principles of this party were declared to be the following: the shah-in-shah structure (monarchy), the Iranian Constitution, and the program of the "revolution of shah and people." After the formation of the "Rastakhiz" all the trade-union labor organizations were attached to the new party. Thus, by the time of the Third OIW Congress, which was convoked in 1976, the process of the complete nationalization of all of Iran's trade-union labor organizations had been completed.

Upon the initiative of the government and the leadership of the Rastakhiz Party, the central place in the work of the Third OIW Congress was taken up by the discussion, or, more precisely, the glorification of a new point in the program of the "revolution of shah and people," which had been proclaimed in 1975--"on expanding private ownership in industry." However, the course of this congress testified to the growth of the Iranian proletariat's political consciousness. The congress demonstrated that it was becoming more and more difficult for the regime to utilize similar maneuvers to create among the workers any illusions about the trans-class nature of the upper circles of the state authorities in Iran.

Taking into account the growth of dissatisfaction among the working classes, and, primarily, that of the workers and a considerable portion of the urban middle strata, as well as the worsening of their material and social position, the representatives of the OIW included in a resolution which was passed by the congress a number of points in which the workers' demands were reflected. Thus, the congress recommended to the government institutions and the parliament that a new labor bill be expedited "for the purpose of establishing more equitable relations between labor and capital." The delegates to the congress declared themselves in favor of a bill to be prepared to provide social insurance for unemployed workers.

Increasing inflation, continuing increases in the cost of living, a decline in business activity, the growth of unemployment, exacerbation of the housing crisis, and other negative phenomena led to a growth of dissatisfaction among broad strata of the working class with the policy of the Iranian upper circles. The activities of the government were also subjected to criticism from certain circles of the ruling classes, who warned the authorities about the imminent sociopolitical crisis.

The shah and the trade-unions created by him were compelled to recognize the fact that, despite the intensification of the policy of reformism and social demagoguery, despite the increasing harshness of the repressions, the opposition to the regime was growing apace. The ruling circles, organizing noisy political campaigns, stepping up pro-monarchist and great-power propaganda, were unsuccessful in their attempts to avert the onset of a sociopolitical crisis. Neither the harshness of the internal political course nor the extension of repressions against all manifestations of opposition to the ruling circles could prevent the onset of a potentially explosive crisis situation. This was testified to by the events of the autumn of 1977, in particular, by the student riots which were put down with the aid of army units.

However, the shah and his circle did not proceed to mitigate the internal political course. In a book entitled "Towards a Great Civilization," which was published in January 1978 in millions of copies, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi meticulously attempted to depict Iranian society as standing on the threshold of a "great civilization" and guaranteeing all Iranians well-being and prosperity.

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The student riots of November 1977 played the role of a unique expeditor of the political crisis in the country. Nevertheless, the Iranian upper circle was implacable in its striving by means of open suppression to quickly put an end to any kind of opposition outbreaks. At the beginning of January 1978 the Rastakhiz Party convoked an extraordinary congress in Tehran, where its delegates--representatives of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and other toadies of the regime--sharply condemned the outbreaks by the students and demanded that the rights to receive a higher education be taken away from those young persons who would not accept the three principles of the Party: the shah-in-shah structure, the Iranian Constitution, and the program of the "revolution of shah and people."

Within several days after the opening of the congress riots began in Iran's religious center--the city of Qum; these laid the foundation for mass opposition outbreaks. The most important phase in deepening the opposition outbreaks was the Tabriz uprising in February 1978, in which about 100,000 persons took part. During the course of the spring and summer of 1978 anti-government outbreaks and uprisings engulfed many of the country's cities. Particularly significant among them were the mass riots in Mashad (21--22 July 1978) and the uprising in Isfahan and several other cities in this province on 8--11 August of this same year.



A characteristic trait of the urban uprisings which took place during the first half of 1978 was the fact that the political forces which participated in them were diverse in their social nature and political orientation; they were united in their hostile attitude towards the authorities. The leaders and most active participants in these outbreaks were the "traditional" urban middle classes, and linked with them were strata of workers, students, and paupers. The majority of the urban middle classes resolved to demonstrate openly against the authorities because during the course of the accelerated development of capitalist relations many of them were being deprived of their own economic and social positions. Moreover, during the so-called campaign "against high prices and inflation," which was organized by the upper circles of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in 1975-1978, many members of the urban middle classes--petty traders, artisans,<sup>7</sup> owners of small-scale enterprises in the service fields--were repressed. By setting fire to and wrecking motion-picture theaters, nightclubs, and offices occupied by the government-sponsored, pro-shah Rastakhiz Party, members of these strata spontaneously expressed their own protest against the arbitrary rule of the bureaucratically totalitarian shah's regime as well as against the extreme strengthening of the positions of the Iranian financial-industrial oligarchy.

Through the mass information media the ruling circles attempted to focus the attention of Iranian and world public opinion on these destructive aspects of the anti-government outbreaks, on terrorist acts and the manifestations of anarchism, in order to present the mass opposition disturbances in the country as a retrograde movement directed, so to speak, against the modernization which was being promulgated by the shah's government.<sup>8</sup> The authorities placed particular emphasis on the fact that in developing these outbreaks a notable role was played by religious leaders who had been well known for their conservatism in the past. A great deal of support was rendered to the shah's regime in this matter by the imperialist states, and primarily by the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain. The ruling circles within the country attempted to utilize a similar version of the nature of the opposition outbreaks in order to split up the forces hostile to the regime and principally to prevent the active and mass inclusion in the revolutionary struggle of the industrial proletariat and other working classes.

The broad and active participation of the Shi'ite clergy in the anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist movement of the masses is explained by the specific conditions under which the development of Iranian society proceeded in the 1960's and 1970's. The revolutionary outbreaks in Iran were initially spontaneous in principle. However, as the sociopolitical crisis deepened, the role of the factions opposed to the shah's regime --ranging from left-wing to religious and right-wing nationalist--in organizing mass outbreaks against the authorities became more and more significant. On this level a notable line was crossed in August 1978, when the Iranian ruling circles were compelled to proclaim the introduction of certain democratic rights and liberties, including the right to establish parties acting "within the framework of the law." Under the conditions of broadening the social base

of the mass revolutionary outbreaks, the opposition political factions, taking advantage of the disarray which had engulfed the ruling circles, stepped up their own activities considerably. The greatest activity with regard to organizing mass, anti-shah demonstrations was developed by the Iranian opposition clergy, which succeeded by the autumn of 1978 in becoming the recognized predominant force in the popular movement. This shift, which occurred during the period when the movement was entering its critical phase, made a strong impression on the further development of the revolution as well as on its nature as a whole.

The prerequisites and causes of the advancement of these opposition religious-political figures to the leadership of the popular revolution were brought about by the following circumstances. As we have noted above, those in the forefront of the mass demonstrations against the shah's authorities were primarily the traditional urban middle classes. A breakdown of the traditional foundations of everyday and social life occurred in Iran at the same time as the worsening of their material and social positions. Sensing with particular acuteness primarily the external manifestations of these processes, and failing to perceive the profound reasons for the worsening of living conditions, these classes hurled their wrath against the development of the country according to the "Western model" and against those forces which were promulgating pro-Western and pro-imperialist courses.

And inasmuch as these masses (with the exception of the students) did not yet have access to any ideological systems except religious and nationalistic religious ones, the concepts of social justice set forth by the religious leaders and petty-bourgeois ideologists, decorated with religious and nationalistic tints, exerted an enormous influence on them.

We should take into consideration the fact that Iran's ruling circles during the 20th century had striven to maintain the influence of Islam on the masses as a screen against the dissemination of progressive ideas. They set up serious obstacles to the spread not only of Marxist-Leninist ideas but also to block bourgeois-democratic ideas. Marxist-Leninist and all genuinely progressive parties and factions were persecuted and subjected to repressions.

As a result of all this, a definite political and ideological vacuum was formed in the camp of the democratic forces; this vacuum began to be filled by the ideological and political trends led by the religious-political figures. The fact of the matter is that the Shi'ite clergy under the conditions of continuing persecutions of the progressive organizations maintained a certain political independence, and they had legal organizations at their disposal. In comparison with other political factions of the opposition, this gave the clergy a considerable advantage. At the same time the Iranian Shi'ite clergy attempted to utilize the increasing dissatisfaction and the growth of spontaneous opposition outbreaks among broad strata of the population to preserve its own positions and authority. Another important fact is that the country's accelerated development along Western lines was viewed by the clergy as a considerable threat to its own interests. And, finally,

no small role in the advancement of opposition-minded religious leaders to the forefront was played by almost all the forces hostile to the shah's regime, left-wing organizations as well as various factions of the national bourgeoisie--primarily, the merchant bourgeoisie (the upper circles of the marketplace), which was suffering from the dominance of monopolistic factions (the industrial-financial oligarchy which had emerged in Iran during the 1960's and 1970's) as well as from the arbitrary rule of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

These circumstances in the aggregate, as well as the enormous authority which was enjoyed among broad strata of workers by the implacable foe of the shah's regime and American imperialism, the prominent religious-political leader, Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini,<sup>9</sup> made it possible for the opposition religious figures to seize the leadership of the popular revolution. This circumstance, however, cannot serve as an argument for setting forth the basically erroneous thesis of the Islamic nature of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. Despite the significant role played by the religious figures, the Iranian revolution was not naturally a religious movement. Already in the first phase of its development the mass outbreaks by the "traditional" urban middle classes and the social forces close to them objectively led to the destruction of the foundations of the pro-imperialist and anti-popular regime, clearing away the path for democracy and the movement against development "in accordance with the Western model."

The attempt by the shah's authorities, by means of limited political and economic concessions, to break up the wave of the opposition movement was unsuccessful. In August--September 1978 opposition moods engulfed most of the urban workers, and strikes began at certain industrial enterprises in Tabriz, Ahvaz, and Bekhshahr [?]. By the beginning of September 1978 the call for the overthrow of the shah's regime and the Pahlavi dynasty which the Ayatollah Khomeini had addressed to the participants in the opposition outbreaks had become the main slogan of the mass demonstrations. Fearing a further deepening of the anti-shah outbreaks, the shah's court and the government adopted a decision to introduce a state of martial law for six months in the capital and 11 other major cities throughout the country. This decision was met with dissatisfaction on the part of the masses. On 8 September 1978, after the government's decision to introduce martial law was announced over the radio, tens of thousands of inhabitants of Iranian cities went out onto the streets and squares, demanding that the government's decision be rescinded. The demonstration by Tehran's inhabitants was particularly impressive. In order to break up and smash the demonstrators, the military units resorted to arms. As a result of this bloody slaughter, more than 3,000 demonstrators were killed in the capital. However, "Bloody Friday," 8 September, did not lessen the tension within the internal political situation.

After a certain calm, caused partly by the fact that the tragic earthquake which occurred at the end of September in Khorasan temporarily distracted the attention of the broad masses from politics, a new phase ensued in the



development in the Iranian revolution. Under the conditions of martial law, when the conduct of mass manifestations and demonstrations was made considerably more difficult, strikes and work stoppages became the basic form of struggle by the workers. The movement's social range was broadened significantly; it came to include office workers, students, school-teachers, faculty members at higher educational institutions, farm workers, and what was particularly important, the industrial proletariat.

Of no small significance were the strikes by government office workers, for example, the strikes by postal workers at the end of September 1978, the strike by office workers in the state and private banks, officials of ministries, and so forth. By disrupting the normal operations of political and economic institutions, these strikes facilitated the erosion of the foundations of the existing political structure, and they led to a deepening of instability.

Also influential on the outcome of the struggle between the revolutionary forces and the shah's authorities were the outbreaks by the industrial proletariat. The first strikes by industrial workers began at the end of September and the beginning of October 1978. By means of various concessions, in particular, granting a raise in wages to the workers and office employees, the government attempted to halt the growth of the labor movement. As a result of the measures which were adopted, a certain ebb was observed in the workers' strike struggle. However, at the end of October the strike struggle by the workers and office employees again intensified. Of particular importance in its results was the two-week strike by oil workers which began in early November 1978. This strike, along with the general strike by oil workers which began in December, inflicted a tangible and heavy blow on the positions of the shah's regime, depriving it of its main source of state revenues.

The strike struggle by the workers and office employees, which developed on a broad scale later in the autumn of 1978 actually reduced to nothing the efforts of the military government of General G. Azhari (he had become premier in early November 1978), who by means of repressions intended to achieve a lowering of the revolutionary wave. A particular characteristic of this stage of the strike movement was the fact that among the demands of the proletariat political questions of a general national importance were advanced to the forefront. Thus, the oil workers under the leadership of newly created trade unions set forth demands for the liquidation of SAVAK, for bringing its leaders up before courts,<sup>10</sup> they called for the immediate satisfaction of the demands by the students and faculty members of Tehran University, etc.

Of considerable importance was the fact that in October--November 1978 strikes engulfed enterprises in the state sector as well as those in the private sector. Strikes began simultaneously at enterprises of a certain industrial group or branch. For example, workers of the Bekhshahr industrial group, consisting of 40 industrial facilities, began to strike on one

and the same day.<sup>11</sup> The strike of oil workers in the province of Khuzistan was supported by workers at all facilities of the petroleum and natural gas industry throughout the country. The simultaneity of strikes in such sectors vitally important for state finances and the economy as the petroleum industry and transport paralyzed economic activity and created thereby almost insurmountable difficulties for the functioning of government organs.

On the whole the total efforts of the working classes, and primarily those of the industrial proletariat doomed to failure all the efforts of the military government to stabilize the situation and put a brake on the development of revolutionary events in the country. The shah and his immediate circle, upon the insistent advice of their friends across the ocean--the administration of President J. Carter--undertook serious steps in order to split up the opposition. However, the traitorous action by Bakhtiar, one of the leaders of the opposition of the liberal-bourgeois organization known as the National Front (NF), who agreed to head up a civilian government, did not lead to a split in the opposition movement (for his agreement to head up the shah's government Bakhtiar was excluded from the NF).

During the period of struggle against the accomodating line of Bakhtiar's government (he was joined by a small group of bourgeois opposition figures) the Iranian proletariat, and especially the oil workers, again demonstrated a high degree of political consciousness. Though continuing their general strike, which hindered the export of Iranian petroleum, the oil workers nevertheless agreed to extract and refine petroleum in amounts necessary for the country's needs.

Thus, the revolutionary actions of the Iranian workers, their irreconcilability and stubbornness, constituted one of the most important factors which led to the victory of the popular revolution of 1978--1979 in Iran.

As a result of the armed uprising of 10--11 February 1979, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the financial-industrial oligarchy, and the higher officers of the army, which together comprised the principal bulwark of the shah's court, were deprived of supreme power. The victory of the revolution led to the abolition of the constitutional monarchy in Iran.

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The liquidation of the pro-American, anti-popular shah's regime inflicted considerable damage to the positions of international imperialism, and especially those of the United States. However, the religious-political figures and the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois figures who came to power as a result of the revolution were not unanimous in their opinions with regard to the future Iranian society. Those factions of the Iranian national bourgeoisie who belonged to the National Front and several of its leaders who were well known for their hostility to the regime enjoyed a popularity among the working masses. Nevertheless, many influential leaders of the National Front during the period of the 1978--1979 revolution adhered to

an accomodating line with regard to the shah's regime. They advocated that the following principle be carried out in Iran: the shah reigns but does not govern. However, after a meeting in early November 1978 between the leader of the NF, Doctor Karim Sanjabi, and Ayatollah Khomeini in France, the NF leadership was compelled to accept the thesis that the Iranian crisis could be resolved only if the power of the Pahlavi dynasty were to be abolished. By this time, i. e., by the beginning of November 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini had already become the generally recognized symbol in the struggle against the shah's regime and imperialism. Therefore, there was nothing else for the NF members and other bourgeois organizations to do but recognize his priority in the leadership of the popular revolution. In the concluding stages of the revolution the authority of Ayatollah Khomeini became ever more established; many leaders of the NF and other bourgeois-liberal organizations were compelled, albeit pro forma, to acknowledge Khomeini's concept of the structure of the new state; this enabled them to become part of the government which was formed after the victory of the revolution. Certain bourgeois leaders refused to follow this course and entered into opposition to Khomeini. As a result, a split occurred in the ranks of the liberal bourgeoisie and the bourgeois democrats. This strengthened the position of Khomeini's followers still more.

Upon entering into the provisional revolutionary government which was headed up by M. Bazargan, however, the members of the NF and other factions of the national bourgeoisie waged a struggle to establish the rule of the Iranian bourgeoisie in the country.

By the autumn of 1979 the polemic over the question of the nature of the republic's socioeconomic system had grown into a sharp struggle between the two principal political factions which occupied dominant positions in the power structure after the coup of February 1979. The first of these is a faction of persistent Khomeinists, which advocates the continuation of an anti-American course and, to a certain degree, a deepening of the social revolution. In their opinion, the following changes should be planned and carried out: the liquidation of large-scale landowning, the transfer of land to those who work it, the allotting of the functions of running the state enterprises to workers' and office employees' councils set up at industrial enterprises, nationalization of banks and large private industrial enterprises, nationalization of foreign trade and other measures--aimed at creating in Iran the foundations of an "Islamic society of justice." Moreover, in drawing up a constitution for an Islamic Republic with the active participation of religious leaders, Iran is legislatively bound by the dominant position of the Shi'ite ulemas in governing the country and in creating an "Islamic society."

The second faction, which holds strong positions in the financial and economic spheres, and to a certain degree in the machinery of the state, consistently defends the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie. The leaders of this faction are Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, and many other well-known figures. Bazargan and his followers have expressed, in fact, a

negative attitude towards attempts to seek a "third path" of development, as advocated by Khomeini and his followers. The liberals advocate the usual capitalist path of development. They are against the active inclusion of the clergy in public organizations and in the activity of the executive authority. The call for a moderate course in the sphere of domestic policy corresponds to a course in foreign policy which would be accommodating to the West; this was advocated by Bazargan and his associates.

The struggle between the revolutionary-petty-bourgeois and the liberal tendencies on the Iranian stage became particularly evident right at the end of October and the beginning of November 1979, when the Iranian-American crisis grew considerably worse. A more open advocacy of their views by the liberals, however, with regard to Iranian problems cost Bazargan and his associates their high positions. Bazargan and those ministers who were close to him in their thinking were forced to resign (6 November 1979). The determination of the political course and control over the activities of the ministers passed to the Islamic Revolutionary Council, which also performs the role of the supreme legislative authority. The Council is dominated by Khomeini supporters, and it basically consists of religious-political leaders.

Bourgeois liberals, however, have not been completely removed from governing the country. Moreover, they have not ceased their efforts aimed at preparing the conditions for evolving a new Iranian regime into a usual capitalist one. In the struggle between these two principal factions, which is still going on, the liberals are supported by part of the democratic intelligentsia, certain circles in the army, and partially by some officials in the state machinery. Objectively, the strengthening of the liberals' positions is facilitated by the activity of the leftist organizations which are in opposition to the present authorities, as well as factions with Maoist and Trotskyite tendencies--these are not influential but are active and noisy.

With regard to the NPI [People's Party of Iran] (Tudeh), during the recent period since the February 1979 uprising it has succeeded in winning over a great deal of popularity among a certain part of the Iranian proletariat, students, intellectuals, and other strata of society. This party has worked out and published a program for the further progress of Iranian society along the path of social progress and democracy. It proposes the strengthening of the state sector's role as a material base for subsequent progressive changes in the interests of all working classes, and especially those of the proletariat, farm workers, and peasants with little or no land.

The NPI in principle supports the anti-imperialist and anti-monopolist course of the Khomeini group, adhering, however, in their relationship with the ruling faction to a tactic of "alliance and criticism." The party has a negative attitude towards certain components of the Khomeinist policy, and it considers that the course towards monopolizing the supreme



authority being conducted by the religious-political leaders, the resurgence of a unique theocracy, the rejection of a democratic solution of such important questions as the labor, nationality, and women's questions, the attempt to curtail democratic rights and liberties, the policy of suppression which is being practiced in regard to left-wing organizations, create considerable obstacles on the path to consolidating the patriotic and anti-exploiter forces.

In order to consolidate the gains made by the revolution and to disrupt the conspiracies of internal and external reaction, the NPI called upon the Islamic Revolutionary Council, the president, government, and other revolutionary organs to carry out a number of concrete measures, including rooting out the positions of imperialism and propaganda of the upper circle of the Iranian bourgeoisie, a democratic resolution of the land and nationality questions, and an "assurance of the participation of workers and laborers of the city and countryside in the cause of defending the revolution."<sup>13</sup>

Inconsistency and ambiguity constitute a characteristic trait on the whole of the policy of the new Iranian leaders. A similar ambiguity is revealed not only in the relationship to the left-wing forces but also to the working class. Recognition of the official status of workers' councils which were created during the course of the 1978--1979 revolution (this has been reinforced by an article in the republic's constitution), a considerable increase in the official minimum wage level and the pension level, a prohibition on dismissing workers from enterprises, a campaign under the aegis of the state for building cheap houses for workers and peasants, as well as a number of other measures which have been carried out during the last few months, have facilitated the growth of the authority among the workers of the new leaders, especially that of imam Khomeini.

Nevertheless, the material status and living conditions of a significant portion of Iranian workers has remained extremely difficult. Most workers' families continue to huddle in slums, and they lack the opportunity of obtaining necessary medical care.

Up to now the new authorities, despite the demands of workers, have not developed a new labor law. In fact, the republic's constitution ignores the working class, which occupies the central place in social production, representing at the same time the most important social force which consistently opposes the liberal bourgeoisie and efforts to restore the power of the upper-class oligarchy which had been crowded off the Iranian stage as a result of the victory of the 1978--1979 revolution.

The revolution of 1978--1979 facilitated a notable growth in the class consciousness of Iranian workers. After the overthrow of the shah's regime workers actively took part in the struggle for a deepening of the social revolution and for democratic changes.

The growth of class consciousness among Iranian workers and an intensification of their adherence to left-wing (socialistic) ideological and political trends has caused unrest not only among the liberal bourgeoisie but also among the religious-political leaders and those closely associated with them from the milieu of Iran's new leaders. They are applying great efforts in order to "guard" the workers against the influence of the left-wing organizations. Attempts have been made by means of introducing new laws and instructions to curtail the workers' right to strike. In July 1979 the government of M. Bazargan approved a plan by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to create "special forces," which could be utilized for "keeping order in labor relations." The left-wing press characterized this "law" as an openly hostile act in relation to the workers. Government institutions and committees, in whose activity religious figures often play the leading roles, strive in all manner of ways to hinder contacts between labor organizations and the left-wing parties. Upon their insistence the councils and trade-union organizations created at many enterprises are co-opting religious and political figures who have no connection with production.

On the whole, despite the policy of the new leadership, aimed at establishing controls over the labor movement, Iranian workers, especially the industrial proletariat, are demonstrating more and more often their striving to combine outbreaks against American imperialism with a broadening of the struggle against exploitation and capitalism, finding support in this among the left-wing organizations and groups. The split-up nature of the labor organizations and the lack of unity among the left-wing forces has, however, hindered the transformation of the labor movement into a decisive factor in Iran's sociopolitical life.

Nevertheless, we can assert with confidence that the ongoing revolutionary process is stimulating a further growth in the workers' political consciousness. It is difficult to overvalue the importance of this phenomenon if we take into consideration the fact that the growth of political consciousness among the workers would enable the left-wing forces of Iran to mobilize the broad laboring masses to struggle further for social progress and democracy. Of course, without a unification of the left-wing forces and the transformation of the left-wing parties into mass ones this task seems incredibly difficult. One way or another the fate of the Iranian revolution will depend, to a great extent, not only on the political course adopted by the present-day Iranian leaders but also, in considerable measure, on the behavior of the Iranian workers, and primarily that of the industrial proletariat.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. If in 1972 Iran's revenues from petroleum amounted to 2.4 billion dollars, in 1974 they reached the level of 18.7 billion dollars, and in 1976--20.7 billion dollars. Central Bank of Iran, "Economic Report

and Financial Balance Sheet for the Year 2535," Tehran, 1977 (in Persian).

2. ETTELAAT, 1 May, 1976. "Statistical Yearbook of the Country for the Year 2536," Teheran, 1978 (in Persian), p 252.
3. Ibid.
4. A. M. Mustafabeyli, "Politika pravyashchikh krugov Irana v rabochem voprose (1963--1978 gg.) [Policy of the Ruling Circles of Iran on the Labor Question (1963--1978)] (Abstract of Candidate's Dissertation), Moscow, 1980, p 4.
5. RASTAKHIZ, 30 January 1978.
6. MARDOM (organ of the NPI), 10 February 1980.
7. BIRIKIM, Istanbul, No 48, 1979, p 14.
8. A similar version was actively supported by the leaders of the Western powers, and particularly by those of the United States and Britain. See, for example, the declaration by the President of the United States, J. Carter, NEW YORK TIMES, 14 November, 1978.
9. Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was born on 24 September 1902 in the town of Khomein, Mahallat province (located in the central part of Iran, south of the city of Qum). Prominent religious-political figure. For his open condemnation of the shah's pro-American and anti-popular policy he was subjected to imprisonment on several occasions during the early 1960's. In November 1964 he was exiled from Iran to Turkey. Somewhat later he settled in Iraq (in a Shi'ite center in the city of Najaf). During the period of the Iranian revolution he advocated the overthrow of the shah and the abolition of the monarchy in Iran. At the beginning of October 1978 he flew from Iraq to Paris and lived in a suburb of this city until his return to Tehran on 1 February 1979. In January 1978 on Khomeini's orders a Revolutionary Council was created in France; it began to play the role of the supreme legislative organ after the victory of the February 1979 uprising in Tehran.
10. M. Keykhan, "Workers' Strike Movement Opens New Phase in Struggle of Iranian People," DONYA, 1978, No 8, pp 14-21.
11. Ibid.
13. MARDOM, 1 May, 1980.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### ISRAEL'S ZIONIST POLICIES, EMIGRES' DISENCHANTMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW in English 31 Dec 80 pp 1-3

[Article by L. Korneyev, master of historical science: "A Zionist 'Paradise' in its True Colors"; abridged from SOVETSKIYE PROFSOYUZY, No 23, 1980]

[Text] According to official data, 1,000 Jews leave Israel every month. On his return from a trip to the United States, Israel's minister of agriculture, A. Sharon, said that New York was becoming the world's biggest Jewish city, instead of Tel Aviv.

Today there are twice as many Israeli engineers in the United States and Canada than in Israel. More than 10 percent of the Israeli Jews--350,000 people--now live outside their country.

This exodus of Israelis from the "homeland of all Jews" is a clear sign of a crisis of Israeli society. This had to be admitted even by the Zionist press and by Tel Aviv's officials.

The Zionist "theorists" and many rabbis have been popularizing everywhere the racist idea that the Jews, "a people chosen by God," a "superior race," will meet with success in their efforts to set up a model state for the entire world, and, in this way, prove in practice the correctness of the Biblical-Judaic myth that the Jews are destined by Jehovah himself to rule all non-Jews. "Just give us the chance to set up our own Jewish state," the Zionists, lackeys of the world's big Jewish bourgeoisie, begged for decades, "and we'll surprise all mankind!" The existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East as a bridgehead of imperialism fitted in with the predatory schemes of the leading capitalist powers.

The Zionists' Jewish state has become a state of such "records" as one of the world's leaders in per capita spending for military purposes, the growth rate of inflation and prices on prime necessities, and unemployment level. Israel is today a country of terrorists, criminals, drug addicts, and scoundrels, and also a country of disinherited and hungry people.

The papers and magazines in many Western countries are full of stories on the scale of the economic bankruptcy of the Zionist government of Israel. They write less about something else, namely, that the exodus of the Israelis from the "promised land" is primarily due to the implementation of the racist principles of Zionism, which are turning against the Jews themselves.



THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper wrote on 27 May 1978 that some of the immigrants in Israel come up against discrimination solely because they have come there from the Soviet Union. The situation is especially distressful for the Georgian Jews. They find it hard to learn Hebrew, which explains why they are subjected to ruthless exploitation and deceived in every possible way. Dirty and heavy work, cultural backwardness and social stagnation--this is the lot of the Georgian Jew.

All of them told me that they cursed the day and hour when they turned in their Soviet passports. Nodari Kiknadze, who hailed from Adjara, said: "I was a school teacher and became a loader. My health is poor, but I'm ready to crawl on my knees back to my wonderful Adjara. May the Zionists be damned!"

Quite just in this connection is the remark in the Algerian newspaper AL-MOUDJAHID contained in an item, published under the heading "Georgian Jews Off to Hell." The paper says: "They thought that they were being resettled in a 'Sacred Land,' but landed up in hell."

The propaganda of chauvinistic emigre sentiments among the Jewish population of the Soviet Union has become a major component of the strategy of anticommunism within the framework of the "psychological war" are unleashed by the world's reactionary forces against our country. Unfortunately, a certain part of Soviet Jews have succumbed to promises of "benefactors" abroad.

What awaited them over there? V. Polsky, who came to Israel from the Soviet Union, complained in the JERUSALEM POST on 29 July 1979: "Discrimination continues here against resettlers from the USSR. The Zionist organizations, which promised us generous aid, are letting the emigres drift for themselves."

David Levi, the Israeli minister of Immigrant Absorption, complained in the newspaper DAVAR: "The Jewish Agency emissaries in France and other countries give lavish promises to resettlers which we are unable to fulfill here. Right now, in 1980, we are sending 64 percent of the immigrants to the developing cities (this is what the Zionists call the settlements in Arab lands occupied in 1967). The greater part of emigres will be directed to these cities in the next 5 years."

Regarding the Soviet Jews as the "world's third Jewish community" (after the United States and Israel), the Zionists of Israel planned to get a million Jews out of our country, mainly through reactionary anti-Soviet and chauvinistic propaganda, supported on a class basis by the world's reactionary forces.

The myth about "anti-Semitism" and "violations of human rights" in the Soviet Union was inflated by a giant anticommunist and anti-Soviet psychological warfare propaganda machine. This scheme, however, fell through: since 1945, only a little over 10 percent of Jews have left from the Soviet Union for Israel and other capitalist countries. At the same time, it is common knowledge that a large number of Jews, who left the Soviet Union for other countries, would like to come back. Many of them are putting in greater effort to make this wish come true than was exerted in gaining leave from the Soviet Union.

It is highly significant that one of the main reasons for this polar "change of sentiments" among the majority of Jews, according to their press statements, was disappointment in "the world of equal opportunities," and also psychological incompatibility with the capitalist system.

This circumstance is admitted by many former Soviet Jews. For instance, a large group of refugees from Israel, who in their time had gone to that country from the Soviet Union and later lived in poverty in Australia, wrote a letter to the United Nations, pointing out that they had been "deceived by Zionist propaganda, which induced them to rupture ties with their mother country." Israeli reality sobered these people and showed them the real face of bourgeois democracy.

The attempts of Zionist Israeli agents to stir up nationalist, anti-Soviet, bourgeois sentiments in the Soviet Union are being resisted by many Soviet Jews, who are honest workers and real patriots of their mother country, where any form of racial discrimination is outlawed.

CSO: 1812

## INTERNATIONAL

### PROBLEMS FACING EMIGRES IN WEST DESCRIBED

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 34, 20 Aug 80 p 15

[Article by Iona Andronov: "What Happens When the Rubicon Has Been Crossed"]

[Text] An unknown man recently called the New York press office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and asked for an interview on personal business. He spoke Russian. His name was Valentin Ivanov. I agreed, although the impending meeting at first did not excite any interest in me. I had previously had to patiently listen to many of these visitors. Their emigre misadventures are generally stereotyped. Having renounced the motherland that reared them, these people moved across the ocean. They supposedly strove for political freedom, but in actuality, they dreamed of an easy life. But abroad, they fell into a social medium that was harsh and wolfish, and therefore completely strange to them. Now they tearfully implore us to save them and help them to return home.

When Ivanov came to me he looked outwardly like the previous petitioners: thin, pale and crestfallen. He nevertheless, in his own way turned out to be a fairly uncommon visitor.

"I am asking LITERATURNAYA GAZETA to print my letter," said Ivanov, and handed me several written pages.

While reading what had been written, I recalled that his name had previously appeared many times on the pages of the leading American newspapers and more than once in the anti-Soviet publications of the emigre rabble. When this Ivanov, an electrician by profession, suddenly appeared in the United States, he was loudly publicized here as some kind of herald of the "dissidents, and ostensibly the "rebellious leader of the Russian workers" to boot. This is why he was granted an audience with the now deceased boss of the yellow trade unions George Meany. By his calculations, the "Russian worker Ivanov" was to play a special role in the undermining propaganda against our country. However, all references to Valentin Ivanov soon disappeared from the American press, as if by command. The reason for this is apparent from Ivanov's letter that is published below.



It is timely now to publish the names of those stateless turn-coats mentioned in his letter, for these subjects have now become very noticeably more animated in the United States on the eve of the impending Madrid meeting of the representatives from the states participating in the European Conference. Certain ringleaders of the "dissidents," on the instructions of and the money of the CIA have turned up in New York and Washington. They are preparing to go to Madrid in order to dramatize the noisy antisoviet tricks and scandalous press conferences there. This is why it is useful to know in advance who plans to go to the meeting in Madrid and on whose dollars.

As for the complicated, broken fate of Valentin Ivanov, judging from my conversations with him, he is remorseful for his past delusions and wants to atone for his guilt before the Soviet people. His suffering public confession is perhaps caused, in my opinion, by the fact that he has really remained a "Russian worker" with all the following consequences. Such a person, probably, never gets accustomed to capitalist America. And I will add that Valentin Ivanov by daring to give this letter to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, consciously exposed himself to a very serious risk.

It is difficult to write about this. I do not want to look at the past for there is not very much that is pleasant there. There is even less in the present, and the future is quite gloomy. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is necessary to write. It is not a matter of my personal fate. I selected it myself and will accept all that it sends me. The problem is that the following phenomenon occurs in today's life: the radio voices hum, conversations are held and opinions are formed. Someone collects his skinny suitcase and crosses the border in the pursuit of "human rights" (as I did 2½ years ago). I know that this is some fraction of a percent, but behind it stand living people who were deceived or deceived themselves. I would like to show in the example of my own life what happens after the "Rubicon has been crossed." Perhaps this will help someone to have a better understanding of what is happening, and will warn others. I would like to stipulate immediately that it was worse for others, much worse, especially for those who left in pursuit of the "beautiful life." It was easier for me because I left "with a biography" and received an invitation from G. Meany to attend the congress of the American Federation of Labor (Sakharov was also invited to it). I was in contact with the "leadership" of the so-called dissidents. They still somehow took my opinion into consideration and were cautious.

Let me say a few words about myself. I am a Russian, a working electrician. I was born in Siberia in 1930. I lost my father in the 1930's. Unpleasantness started for me in 1949, and in 1977 I left the country. Twenty-eight years passed from 1949 to 1977, a whole life. So much happened during this time that I think would suffice for two lives. This is not the place to find out "who is guilty?": fate, life, or the properties of the personality. I think that as in any human fate, all three were involved. I can only speak of proportions, but what kind of scales can be used to determine the specific weight of a certain component? Before I left I was told: "Stay, and let us forget everything that has happened."

But I had already formed a definite idea about the world. I believed that only there, in the West, could a man be free. Only there was the worker reliably protected by free trade unions. I left with such a frame of mind, bearing a grudge, malicious and flushed with the preceding struggle for the exit visa. In the West I became acquainted with the dissidents who invited me to their speeches. I even appeared several times. It happened, but fortunately, this acquaintance did not last long.

I was perplexed from the very beginning by how to treat these "fighters." Mario Corti<sup>1</sup>, is an Italian who organizes all the major dissident measures in Europe. He stated who would speak, where and when, in a tone that was faintly like an order. And once when Turchin began to be stubborn, Corti raised his voice and the other hastily agreed. Another time he rudely snubbed the wife of Yankelevich, but he only bit his lip. And Yankelevich was "sold" as the personal representative of Sakharov in the West. Senor Corti could be an hour late and did not consider it necessary to apologize. The dissidents grumbled, but were afraid of him. When I asked who he was to act this way, they all were embarrassed and silent. He treated me cautiously, but once he told me "with pressure" in his voice: "There is unemployment in Russia but it is hidden. You must speak about this." He added, pointing to Bukovski, "He talks about it." I refused of course.

The impression was created that some power was standing behind Corti, but I could not understand what kind. Two instances helped. It was suggested that I go to Turin where the dissidents were gathering who were scattered over all countries. A document was needed for the trip. It took 45 days to draw it up. Then they called up Friendly<sup>2</sup> in Washington. He was a former correspondent in Moscow (I do not remember for which newspaper) and was currently working in some government institution. He called somewhere else (they say the State Department), and I received the necessary document the next day. It was clear that the high official spheres were interested in the measures being taken in distant Turin. A short time passed. Once, on Sunday, L. Alekseyeva called from London. She and V. Turchin urgently invited me to London where measures were being taken to protect Yu. Orlov. (I was summoned at some time on the Orlov affair). It was necessary to fly that evening. I was surprised. How could I fly on Sunday without a visa, without a ticket and without money? They asked me not to leave the hotel until 2 o'clock. During that time they would find the consul in order to obtain a visa and get a ticket. A little later Veronica Shtein called and said that she had ordered the ticket and gotten the money. Luckily they had found the consul. He had gone somewhere for the day. But this case forced me to begin to think.

Whereas I could understand how a State Department official gives instructions to an official in New York to issue a document, by-passing the normal procedure, who could force the British consul in New York to interrupt his Sunday rest, open the office and draw up a visa for me, a Russian electrician? I got the impression that all of this dissident long-drawn out proceedings were component parts of some kind of powerful mechanism of an almost global nature. Then I began to understand

<sup>1</sup>From 1972 to 1975 he worked as a translator in the Italian Embassy in Moscow. He was associated with the so-called International Literary Association that is a subdivision of "Radio Liberty, which is subordinate to the CIA. It is engaged in spreading antisoviet publications. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA wrote about the ILA in No 9, 1975. This note and further ones are from the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editors.

<sup>2</sup>Former correspondent of NEWSWEEK magazine in Moscow, now a worker on National Security Adviser Brzezinski's staff.

who Corti was and why he acts that way. It is not because of a nasty nature nor the lack of culture. He is a balanced and educated person. But this is a well thought-out line of behavior: to show a person his true place in that powerful mechanism in which he is included. This is the beginning of the demoralization process, that psychological process that people who have passed through have already voicelessly hinted to me. It is individual in each specific case, but it is based on a general principle, man is threatened with being deprived of the means for existence. A person who has passed this process becomes completely controllable. He writes, says and does what he is told. People sometimes speak of this secretly and in general phrases. This is why there are so many gray-haired, pale and sickly people here with dimmed and hidden eyes. I recently met A. Polishchuk. It is frightening to look at the man. He is white like the moon, skin and bones, deathly pale, with pinched mouth. Alekseyeva did not look much better when I saw her last. Therefore, when you see or read the speech of such a "fighter for rights," you know that he is fighting for a single right that is now troubling him, the right to exist. In Russia he did not write or speak of this right because he did not think about it, it was implied. Somehow Alekseyeva came up to me, and hesitating slightly, said: "People will come up to you and you must relate everything to them." I answered that no one had to do anything and it was better that they did not approach me. No one did except L. Torn<sup>3</sup>, an American woman who fulfills roughly the same function here in the United States as Corti does in Europe. She carried on a conversation about the fact that America is a business-like country and actions are expected of people here. I said that there would be no "actions." Miss Torn alluded to the fact that I would regret this. My relationship with the dissidents ended with this.

By then I had already "cooled down" a little. I had sized up people and life, and could already compare and draw conclusions. But I had to live somehow. I began to look for work. Although the "Tolstoy Fund"<sup>4</sup> helped me, I still did not lose hope because I counted on the help of the American trade unions. The fact is that immediately after my arrival in the United States, G. Meany had invited me to his residence in Washington. After a 30-minute conversation that mainly consisted of general statements, he asked me what I planned to do further. I said that I would like to find some type of work and get my bearings. "We will try to do something for you," G. Meany said to me in farewell. Within 2 weeks I was triumphantly (in the presence of television reporters and newspaper correspondents) handed a diploma as an honorary member of the trade union of electricians. When I asked whether this gave me the right to obtain work, they answered "yes." But months passed and there was no work. The dissidents and those who manipulate them made transparent allusions to the fact that electricians are not needed here and that they expected some other activity from me.

I called Meany's first assistant, Tom Kahn, in Washington and asked for his help. He assured me that all would be well soon. He invited me to come on a designated day to the hall of a New York hotel (I do not remember the name), where the New York trade unions were organizing a press conference for P. Grigorenko. In the

<sup>3</sup>The daughter of a traitor to the country, a coworker at Radio Liberty who fulfills assignments for the CIA to organize ideological diversions against the USSR.

<sup>4</sup>The activity of the so-called "Tolstoy Fund" that was created in 1939 has an openly antisoviet nature. The leadership of this organization, which regularly receives subsidies from the U.S. State Department also includes representatives of the American special services.



hotel, Shtein immediately took me and presented me to the editor of the largest Russian newspaper in America and the director of Radio Liberty. The latter asked me: "What if we invite you to the station?" A. Sedykh<sup>5</sup> was silent. He had already suggested through his colleagues that I write for his newspaper. I needed work very badly, but not that kind. I quickly responded: "I will come to your station, but I will say only what I think." The faces of my interviewers darkened somewhat. I excused myself and went to look for the trade union bosses. They smiled radiantly, shook my hand with feeling and again promised to arrange everything. But it took another 2 months, a letter to Meany and many phone calls before I obtained a job as a stamp operator at the Edison Price plant (409 E 80th Street, New York). I began to work, to study the language, and already thought that my "adventures" had ended. But what man proposes...

After about 3 months of quiet life, it seems in November 1978, I received a phone call suggesting that I speak before the Vlasovites. I refused. They called again and asked me to "think about it." I answered sharply and the calls stopped. But strange things began at work. The situation suddenly changed drastically. A group was formed of four or five workers who began open badgering. The affair was set up primitively, but effectively. The word "Russian" was associated with something insulting and abusive. At the same time they gave me the hardest work that not even the Americans who had become accustomed to a high rate could stand. They left. I had no where to go. I had to learn to endure this inhuman rate and at the same time defend myself from the insults. It turned out alright for me, but at what a cost! The most unexpected for me was the fact that the leader of the trade union at the plant, a certain Mike Kamix, inspired and headed this campaign. The other workers, there were about a hundred of them, were sympathetic towards me. Sometimes they approached me and shook my hand so that others would not see. The women from the office advised me: "You need to either marry an American or leave." The people understood where the wind was blowing from. It became more difficult to work. When I no longer knew what to do, the chairman of the NLU [National Labor Union], V. Molchanov<sup>6</sup>, wanted to meet me. He invited me to the NLU without special pressure. I politely refused and we parted. And when the badgering reached the apogee and I barely held out, a certain Yu. Mashkov came to me. An interesting conversation took place. Usually undecisive and slippery, this time he spoke confidently, precisely, and even with aplomb. He named several emigre organizations to me.

"You must appear at some one of them. Any one."

"I want to live an honest life and not get into anything."

"This is impossible. Do you really not understand that you are living in an organized world in which everyone serves? (I think that he meant the world of Russian emigration). A struggle is going on, and in this struggle you must stand on someone's side. You are either with us or you are against us. There is no third alternative."

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<sup>5</sup>Pseudonym of Yankel' Tsvibak, editor of the Russian language newspaper NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO that is published in New York. He is closely linked with the Zionist circles in the United States.

<sup>6</sup>Son of a White Russian emigre. During the Great Patriotic War he cooperated with the Hitlerite reconnaissance and served in Vlasov's army. While living in the United States he conducts activity in the NLU that is hostile to the USSR.



At our parting he said self-confidently: "Why are you destroying yourself? It does not matter, you will be with us. What are you going to do now? You are only ruining your health."

By now I no longer believed in anything, not western freedoms, nor human rights, nor free trade unions. When L. Torn called me and invited me to speak at the next meeting of the dissidents in Washington, I decided to use this opportunity to say to them and the press representatives what I thought about all of this waste of time after close acquaintance with it. But the organizers understood me and asked for a preliminary text of the speech. There was no point in writing, they would not let me up to the podium, and I would not stoop to falsification.

In spring of last year my leg began to hurt, and I began to work more slowly. I was fired. I immediately changed apartments and did not give my address to anyone in order to avoid new offers. However Mr. Mashkov found me and sent a letter. The letter was long and polite, but the following phrase was in it: "You nevertheless, belong to the class of people who could be killed by more than burglars." I do not know what happens in the West to those that are not successfully demoralized, but I am frightened by something else. Despite the excellent references I earned at the Edison Price plant, it has already been 7 months and I cannot find permanent work. This is a real danger.

In ending, I would like to say to those at home who think things are bad. Here they will be worse, regardless of the position you take.

9035

CSO: 1807

## INTERNATIONAL

### DESIRE TO INCREASE TOURISM, INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS EXPRESSED

Moscow NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW in English 29 Dec 80 pp 1-4

[Article: "Tourism: From Helsinki to Madrid"; abridged from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 17 December 1980]

[Text] S.S. Nikitin, head of the Central Administration for Foreign Tourism of the USSR Council of Ministers, talks to Vladimir Vesensky, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent.

[Question] The Final Act adopted in Helsinki dealt at length with questions relating to the development of international tourism. It laid special emphasis on the role of tourism as an important means for achieving relaxation of international tension. Could you tell us, what has the Soviet Union done in the way of international tourism since the conference in Helsinki?

[Answer] Our Central Administration and other tourist bodies in the Soviet Union have done a lot to implement the Helsinki agreements in the field of tourism. Over 22 million foreign guests have visited the Soviet Union in the 5 years that have passed since the conference. This is 50 percent more than in the 5 years preceding the Helsinki meeting. In 1979 alone, we played host to 5 million foreigners and 4.3 million of our own citizens went on foreign tours.

A few words about the structure of tourism. More than half of the tourists from abroad come to us from the socialist countries. About 40 percent arrive from the capitalist world. The growing interest in the Soviet Union is having a marked influence on the social composition of the tourists, with white-collar workers, students, farmers, intellectuals, and businessmen making up an increasing proportion. Special mention should be made of the favorable role played in the development of tourism by societies of friendship with the USSR, progressive youth and trade union organizations.

In an effort to create the best possible conditions for mass tourism from abroad, the Soviet Union allocates considerable funds to developing and extending tourist facilities. I am not going to describe all that has been done and will only mention two figures here: we now have accommodation for more than 7 million tourists, including hotel accommodation for over 1 million. Most of it is deluxe suites in such complexes as the Kosmos in Moscow, the Planeta in Minsk, the Pribaltiiskaya in Leningrad, the Rus in Kiev and many other hotels... In the next 5 years we plan to build hotel accommodations for another 40,000 guests in dozens of other Soviet cities and towns.

We constantly bear in mind that tourism is an important means of international contacts and exchanges of spiritual and cultural values. So we try to make programs for tourists staying in our country as instructive as possible, enabling them to see most of the history and culture of the Soviet peoples, and the present state of the Soviet economy, science and multi-national art.

[Question] I would like you to tell now about difficulties that our organizations have to overcome in developing international tourism.

[Answer] The organization of tourism, as any major undertaking, has its own difficulties, both objective and, unfortunately, subjective. Among the objective ones I would give first place to the changing social and economic situation in the capitalist countries which results in mounting inflation, unemployment and sense of insecurity. These are factors that have immediate bearing on tourism. The growth of prices for transport, meals, hotel accommodation and services which is observed in the capitalist countries also effects our own possibilities for sending Soviet tourists abroad.

There also are other negative factors limiting the chances for Soviet tourists to go abroad. For instance, the issuing of visas. While in the USSR visas for foreign tourists are granted, as a rule, within 7 to 10 days, in other countries this period is longer: 3 weeks in the USA, 1 month in Japan, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Argentine, and 6 weeks in Brazil... There are many instances of even these time-limits being extended. There are other complications, too. We try to get over them, with the support of our partners and by showing patience and persistence.

But there are subjective difficulties which are maliciously erected in the way of tourism with the purpose of limiting contacts between socialist and capitalist countries, of sowing fear and enmity to the Soviet Union among the Westerners, of dampening the natural desire of people to see the achievements of our nations.

Recall the recent boycott campaign against the Moscow Olympic Games when the entire mammoth propaganda machine of imperialism was put into gear. Leading newspapers in the USA, Britain, West Germany and other Western countries every day carried slanted articles which described Soviet reality in a biased fashion, blew out of all proportion separate shortcomings in service or road incidents possible on visits to any country and distorted and belittled the vast preparations carried out in the USSR to host olympic games guests.

The campaign of boycott against the olympic games in Moscow failed ignominiously, attaining none of its aims. As for tourism, it is enough to say that the Moscow olympics were attended by tourists from 72 countries, all five continents, including tourists from the USA, Canada, Japan, and the FRG, that is, the countries where the boycott campaign was at its most intensive.

Numerous comments made by foreign guests of the olympics show convincingly that an atmosphere of hospitality surrounded them in the Soviet Union.

The opponents of detente, however, are carrying on their attempts to undermine the process of strengthening mutual ties between the Soviet people and the peoples of other countries in any sphere, including tourism. In doing this they do not stop even at acts of direct terror--planting bombs and sending "hate mail" to Intourist and Aeroflot offices in the USA, France and West Germany.

The successful development of tourist exchanges depends in many respects on well-organized transport services between countries, so I cannot help mentioning the negative influence on tourism in the USSR of such things as the ending of regular flights to the Soviet Union from the USA by the Pan American Airline. Incidentally, as a result of the unilateral actions taken by the Carter administration, Aeroflot, too, had to cut by half its flights to the USA from January 1980.

The curtailment of the number of flights, lack of normal technical and commercial services for Aeroflot planes in the USA, the cancellation in 1980 of marine cruises for Soviet tourists from the USSR to the USA because of the refusal of our U.S. partners to serve these cruises, the temporary suspension of the work of the Committee for Tourism within the U.S - Soviet trade and economic council, which in previous years adopted major decisions regarding Soviet-U.S. tourist exchanges—all these, naturally, have had an adverse effect on the development of our ties with the largest Western country.

[Question] The development of tourism as a form of international contacts also depends on the interest shown by your partners from the capitalist countries. Do you feel the effect in your work of this interest to overcome the existing difficulties and promote through tourism better confidence and friendship between the peoples?

[Answer] There is no doubt about it. Here is, to my view, the most convincing example: one of the largest international tourist associations--the World Tourist Organization--held a conference in Manila this year, attended by delegations from 109 countries, including the Soviet Union, and from more than 80 international bodies. Of course, the conference discussed specific matter, so to speak, the strategy and tactics of developing tourism. And it is also noteworthy that the conference participants showed deep interest and much depth in questions connected with the struggle for peace and for furthering the process of detente. The conference accepted with pleasure Leonid Brezhnev's message in which he noted the role of international tourism as a factor influencing the solution of the most important problems of our time--the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

For the first time in the history of such forums its participants adopted a special document, "The Peace Appeal."

The Madrid meeting on European security and cooperation is a major international event. It is to be hoped that the results of this conference will exercise a beneficial influence on the further harmonious development of international tourism for the good of all mankind. It is with due regard for this optimistic perspective, in spite of all machinations by the "cold warriors," that we are drawing up our program for the development of foreign tourism and tourist industry in the Soviet Union.

CSO: 1812



## REGIONAL

### LOCAL UKRAINIAN PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CRITICIZED FOR LAGGING COAL PRODUCTION

Kiev RADIANS'KA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 29 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by L. Alekseyeva, RADIANS'KA UKRAYINA special correspondent, Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast: "Lagging Must Be Overcome"]

[Text] "It cannot be said that the city party committee did not concern itself with the activity of mining party organizations and production collectives. But the work must be judged on final results, and they are, as we can see, unsatisfactory..."

This is how A. Hrynychuk, mine clearing worker brigade leader at the mine imeni Volodars'kyy, began his talk at the Sverdlovsk city party conference.

Sverdlovsk is one of the coal industry centers in Donbass. Here at the end of 1973 the brigade of the hero of socialist work V. Murzenko from the "Chervonnyy Partyzan" mine was the first in the republic to mine the millionth ton of anthracite since the beginning of the year. Later this indicator of coal output became the collective's norm. On September 4, 1980 this leading brigade extracted its fifth million ton of fuel since the beginning of the five-year plan. Increasing their tempo, the miners today work with a daily loading of 4.3 thousand tons against the task of 4.1 thousand.

Yet even these high indicators do little to solve the problem if they are not widespread. At the April (1980) Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum which reviewed problems in organizational and political work of the Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast Party Committee in its fulfillment of the 25th CPSU Congress decisions, the Sverdlovsk city party organization was subjected to criticism. It was noted especially that the production association "Sverdlovantratsyt" has been lagging for some time, that the city party committee is unable to determine the important work aspects and put into effect the approved decisions.

At the present time conference delegates analyzed what was done and what should be done to correct the situation.

As was noted in the report of the city committee a certain increase was achieved in industrial production and capital investment during the five-year plan. A number of enterprises, among them the mines "Odes'ka" and imeni Sverdlov, fulfilled their five-year goals ahead of time. Forty districts and sections, fifty-nine brigades and more than 500 workers are already working on next year's goals.

V. Pinchuk, mine clearing brigade leader at the "Odes'ka" mine recently became USSR state prize winner; a quick tempo in underground production is maintained by the drivers' brigade from the "Mayak" mine headed by hero of socialist work I. Dehtyar'ov.

Still, behind the successes of individual collectives serious faults remain hidden. As stressed by the delegates, the city party committee, its office and industrial transport sections tolerate shortcomings in economy management. The following facts testify to this: Since the beginning of the five-year plan the association provided almost 1.5 million tons of fuel less than expected, half of it in the current year. Of thirteen mines, only three fulfilled their goals. The mining production rate has decreased in the last two years. Machine accidents have increased because of poor quality repair work. There is a low level of organizational work, production and technological discipline on many coal enterprises.

What is the reason for this? In the period reported the coal industry enterprise situation was discussed at office meetings and plenums more than twenty times. Decisions were made and measures were planned. But most of them did not become part of local practical activity programs, were not supported by essential organizational work. As the delegates stressed, control of decision fulfillment is a weak link in the activities of the city committee and many primary organizations.

The conference also considered problems of further study and application of leading experience. There are collectives in the city which deal successfully with difficulties. The experience of the "Tsentrsoyuz" can be particularly instructive. I. Malyshevs'kyy, party organization secretary, states the following:

"Our mine was lagging. The plan for the first two years of the five-year plan was not fulfilled. The party office together with the administration set up measures to overcome the lagging and also established a strict control. Party membership among basic mining professions was strengthened, the role of section organizations and party groups was also increased. Now we have more than 44 thousand tons of above plan coal."

Why was this experience not generalized? Why did not other collectives in the "Sverdlovtratsyt" production association take it up, including the mining administration "Kharkivs'ke" which functions irregularly. Quite a lot less coal was provided here than planned. In the meantime, in this year alone 45 leading association specialists visited the administration 120 times and its production director came six times. Many orders were issued. But in practice nothing changed.

"Association workers take up the roles of inspectors and not organizers," stated O. Kharchenko, party committee secretary at the "Mayak" mine at the conference. "A change in personnel does not yield positive results. Since 1975 the mine has been headed by four different directors."

Actually, this is not an isolated incident. During the five-year plan all mine managers in the city have been changed, also most of the chief engineers and district heads. Thus administration is substituted for basic daily work with the contingent. This is something that the city committee, association party

organization and its general director H. Chytaladze should think about.

Of course, no one is taking away the responsibility for work shortcomings from the party organizations at the coal enterprises.

"There are reserves in each collective, and better work can be done when they are used," noted V. Lapay, mine clearing brigade leader at the mine imeni Sverdlov. "An increase in personal responsibility of each communist member is very important."

Continuing this thought, we will add that in many Sverdlovsk mine party organizations sufficient demands are not placed upon communists to fulfill the requirements of the Statute. Party members are not always in the front ranks in the complex production situations.

The shortcomings noted are to a large extent the result of errors in ideological-educational work. Some improvements were made in the reported period. Delegates spoke of ideological planning, a single political day, and charts analyzing moral conditions in production collectives. However, the city party committee and many primary organizations often substitute sporadic measures for active work with people. As noted by the secretary of party office ATP 12113 M. Sayenko, better work should be done with youth, especially with students of vocational-technical schools.

Further improvements in living conditions of miners were also discussed at the conference. Living quarters are a serious problem in the city. One of the reasons for delays in available housing is the slow utilization of home-building combine capabilities.

"The task of the city party organization," noted the second Obkoms secretary R. Zveryev at the conference, "lies in overcoming lagging quickly, achieve stable work in all mines, create appropriate conditions for plan and obligation fulfillment by all districts and brigades in the next five-year plan."

Conference delegates' critical remarks and proposals must become the action program for the newly elected city party committee, they must promote improvements in a leading branch -- the coal industry.

9443  
CSO: 1811

## REGIONAL

### UKRAINIAN AGRICULTURAL LEADERS, WORKERS AIR COMPLAINTS

Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 31 Oct, 4 Nov 80

[Article by Serhiy Plachynda: "Steppe Letters; the Writer's View"]

[31 Oct 80, p 2]

[Text] 4. A Village without Brides and Bridegrooms

...I remember hearing a respected writer speak at a meeting. He spoke of the present-day village. Yet it was obvious that he visited the village long ago or only briefly to show off a bit before his relatives and fellow countrymen. In other words, the comrade was not familiar with contemporary processes in the village. But he was tempted to demonstrate his erudition and so he criticized as much as he could...livestock complexes in the village, for example. They are inconvenient, too large, expensive, also requiring pollution control structures which could be used in a medium-sized city (however, he forgot that the city could also use the meat). Another writer liked this speech so well that he also talked about pollution control structures at another meeting (although this comrade often spoke about the need to protect the air, water and soil, that is in favor of building pollution control structures). And then both writers together urged a return to small farms (although we can say openly that these serious speakers would not send their daughters to small farms because there they would have to lug around big sacks of mash, milk by hand, shovel manure, etc).

Needless to say that these critical remarks are based on the proverb: "He heard a bell, but doesn't know where it is." The writer heard that some livestock raising complexes became unprofitable recently...--but why? This needs to be determined. Let us visit the hog fattening complex at the steppe kolkhoz imeni 22d CPSU Congress, Bobrinetskiy Rayon, Kirovograd area. Ivan Vasyl'ovych Koshlak, party secretary and deputy head of livestock husbandry administration, tells the following:

"Yes, we fulfill our meat sale plans but through an extensive (rather than intensive) method; through increase in number of head of cattle and not live weight. What is the problem? Of course, we visit other unlucky complexes in the rayon and oblast and the picture is the same: The animals are given only 40 percent of the needed concentrates. But this is a complex, the ration is determined scientifically, everything is weighed and every gram is considered.



A grave violation in the ration results. The planned grain sale to the state has not been decreased for us; we are forced to take the feed away from the hogs. The result: we do not add to the population's meat. It's like Okhrim's coat--cut here, added there. We can look at the problem from another side," continues Ivan Vasylyovych. "Perhaps we are giving too much grain to the hogs? Are we following old customs? Maybe so, American farmers allow for two times less grain in their rations than we do. But an appropriate feed production industry is needed for this purpose. I am thinking of silage combines, methods of transportation and automated feed kitchens where each weed could be processed and enriched. Thus substantial help is needed from the industry."

This came up also during our recent talk with the head of the agricultural section of the Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast party committee, Anatol' Ivanovych Sytnyk.

"Actually, we don't have the equipment to produce feed; we receive only 30 percent of the required machinery," stated Anatoliy Ivanovych. "Let's consider the Gomelskiy factory. It manufactures excellent KSK-100 combines, but where are they? In the meantime the old KS-2.6 combines are no longer coming out. Not only oblast but feed bases in the whole country have been affected. I think the USSR Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production is primarily to blame for this. It has been in existence for 5 years and what are the results?"

"One of the primary reasons for the lag in feed production is as follows," continues the party worker. "All of our branches, except for agriculture are estimated on the basis of their material-technical resources. Is this not so? Ukr SSR State Planning Committee provides us with state tasks, but we don't even know what we will receive towards this plan--how much fertilizer, machinery, etc. The funds arrive later and, as a rule, cover only half of our needs. Shrewdness, resourcefulness and diligence are needed. Yet, things should be the same here as in factories: A plan is assigned and an appropriate amount of metal also..."

Let us turn now to the far off steppes at the edge of the Dnepropetrovsk area, to the village of Gavrilovka, Pokrovskiy Rayon. We'll stop the wheeled tractor all covered with dried chernozem clods as if with swallow nests. Its driver is Viktor Petrulya, a leading tractor operator (he is also a correspondence course student, plays on the kolkhoz soccer team holding the rayon cup, a young father, etc) hauling feed to the livestock complex. This work requires discipline, precise rhythm and, if need be, self-sacrifice...

When hay was procured for calves in the summer, Viktor worked with his tractor and a hay fork machine literally from dawn to dusk. Loaders and tractors with detachable wagons barely had time to move between the "lyman" [estuary] (as the lowlands are called here) and the complex and back. As soon as they hauled away the last load a downpour came (a typical picture of the 1980 summer). But not one wisp of hay followed the estuary's waters. "Thanks to Petrulya," I was told. "He is an expert; he juggles the hay fork like a circus performer." This was a few days ago, they say. Then the cold wind came and drizzles. For 48 hours Vita Petrulya did not leave the the cabin of his tractor with the hay

fork; the calves at their summer camp had to be saved, they had to have straw. He loaded continuously and the boys hauled. Viktor slept in the tractor, but not one calf became ill.

Petrulya does not talk about himself.

"We're short of mineral fertilizer, we receive only half of what we need," frets the young farmer. "We have more than enough organic fertilizer, but not enough equipment to take it to the fields. Even now corn is being mowed for silage, the area should be manured, but where will we get the machines? This causes crop and feed shortfall!"

The party worker and machine operator think alike. They believe in the state idea of new and more perfect goals in agriculture.

"I am doing unnecessary work," admits Viktor. "For example, instead of hauling manure to the fields for a better harvest, I am supplying the complex with straw. Why? Because there are not enough of these "PTS" wagons. That's why we stack hay in the steppe rather than near the complexes. During bad weather it's much more difficult to haul than in the summer. And in the winter or early spring? Even those wagons we have are worn out and of poor quality," claims the tractor operator clapping the iron side of the wagon. "These are my complaints to the Dzhankoyaskiy factory: The metal on the wagons is much too thin, even a half millimeter more would be better! Even if they were more expensive they would last longer. As it is now, in a year or two (we don't rest our wagons here) they have to be welded and repaired. In the meantime the electric welder does not work on fine plating and there are only two gas welders at the kolkhoz. The Dzhankoyaskiy people's metal economizing is very costly to the farmers. This is the "economy" which hurts our feed basis and as a result of which we cannot sell more meat to the state."

Now let's return to the Bobrinets' area to conclude our talk with Ivan Vasylovych Koshlak, party committee secretary at the kolkhoz imeni 22 CPSU Congress.

"These difficulties are, of course, temporary," he states. "We will strive for abundant harvests which would be a powerful stimulus for livestock husbandry; we will anticipate help from the industry, we will also look for reserves; we cannot go back to small farms. Actually, if you're interested in small farms today, take a look in those kolkhozes where they may be found."

We did not have to go far, only to the neighboring kolkhoz. It was Sunday. A group of worried officials stood near the office. They had no time to talk to me.

"We're going 'carolling.'"

This term surprised me at first. Later when I visited similar small farm kolkhozes in Nikolaev and Kherson areas I got used to it. It means begging from house to house for women to take care of the hogs on the farm or to milk the restless cows which had not been milked the previous day. Volunteers are mostly from among the retired people. I did not see any girls or young women at the small farms I visited. All officials agree that in the last 10 to 12 years no

secondary school graduate signed up for small farms. At the same time, boys with a graduation certificate gladly become machine operators. (I saw this, for example, at the kolkhoz imeni Kabanets', Obukhivskiy Rayon in Kiev area, and at "Rosiya" kolkhoz, Golopristsanskiy Rayon, Kherson area.)

It's not difficult to see the pattern. One after another the girls leave the small farm villages.

The demographic picture in the village, therefore, changed abruptly compared to the post-war years. At that time the village survived because of the women. Now it is supported by men, more accurately by machine operators. We can see what holds these young men in the village--it is technology, high earnings and comfortable living quarters (as a rule, the kolkhoz puts up beautiful rental cottages for machine operators). What is the fate of the girls? Heavy, physical work on farms? It is, of course, unfair for the stronger sex to operate machinery and the weaker sex to haul heavy sacks. The girls cannot accept this. Therefore, we see them in snow-white uniforms next to long conveyor belts in the equipment building factories of Kiev.

And thus we have villages without brides and bridegrooms. What do the young machine operators do here? Lead a solitary, bachelor existence? Oh, no! In their own "Zhygulyas" and "Moskvychs" they hurry off to those villages where there are complexes. Let's go there too. We can stop off even at kolkhoz imeni the 22d CPSU Congress in the Bobrinets' area. There are only young people at the hog fattening complex. Although each operator (the word "pig tender" is no longer used) is assigned 500 animals, all laborious processes have been mechanized and automated and so they work cheerfully and eagerly. The same is true at the large cattle complex. Girls and young women are skilled in machine milking (but are not milkmaids). This provides for an atmosphere of youthful persistence, enthusiasm and professional competition. Halya Olefirenko is ahead of everyone. She fulfilled the 5-year milking plan in 3 years and 4 months, and is working today towards the 3d year of the next 5-year plan. Her friends are close behind her. Among the "pursuers" is also Volodya Mishchenko, a young milkman of medium height, a happy smile and bright reddish-copper hair. Recently he won third place at the republican competition for milking machine operators losing to girls from Vinnitsa. He met beautiful Dusya at a seminar for young milkmaids at the rayon center. A Komsomol wedding was held, and now they are here together working in shifts. They are also taking correspondence courses at the zoo-veterinary technical school.

"Volodya, would you like to be a milkman on a small farm without this mechanization?" I ask him.

"But I am a locksmith here too, it's very interesting work," is his evasive answer.

At the other end of the spacious cowshed girls' laughter may be heard; as long as the vacuum apparatus' rhythmic suction continues, the youthful chatterboxes can joke around. It seems unbelievable that somewhere nearby, in the neighboring village, nervous officials "will carol" by the windows of retired people.

And so if we visited all 10,000 of Ukraine's kolkhozes, I am sure we wouldn't find any administration head who would be brave enough to address a recent graduate as follows:

"Nadiyka, come work for us as a milkmaid or pig tender."

A positive reply can come only when this is offered:

"Nadiyka, we are inviting you to accept a position as operator or master of machine milking."

Then a competition may be held for the position of master of machine milking as it is done, for example, at the complex of kolkhoz imeni Chkalov, Novobuzkiy Rayon in the Nikolaev area.

We travel there.

"The milkmaid's work is now the most intelligent work in the kolkhoz," states administration head Anatoliy Trokhymovych Popkov.

Cows are kept untied in separate stalls.

At first you see a large resting place for the herd filled with animals with plastic ear tags. There are no "Kvitkas", "Man'kas" or "Krasulas" here now. There are only numbers. Chewing the cud phlegmatically the cows patiently await their turn. Two animals enter the milking stall tandem; they step in familiarly and eagerly; special treats made of fodder flour await them.

The udders must be quickly rinsed with warm water and massaged. The first teats must be milked. The apparatus must be turned on. The milking beakers must be set in place adhering to the teats immediately. A careful observation of the pulsating milk in the glass tubes for three-four-five minutes; turn off the apparatus and release the cow through the front door into the next enclosure -- this is the work of the master of machine milking. Everything else -- feed supply, feeding, and manure removal are tasks for machine operators assigned to the farm (livestock mechanized detachment).

Of course, each master is assigned 80-85 cows. The milking process lasts about three hours. This is quite stressful. However, milking is done twice. This is convenient from the organizational standpoint, but lowers animal productivity to some extent: from each cow not more than 2,200 kg of milk are obtained per year. In addition, cows are worn out from machine milking ahead of time (each year a third of the cattle is considered below standard).

[4 Nov 80, pp 2-3]

[Text] [However, we have enough workers," states the chief zootechnician in the complex. "There is no need to "go carolling"; the girls come here eagerly and we do have competitions for open positions of machine milking masters. Of course, the work is not very easy, but compared to small farms one might say that our girls do aristocratic work. The apparatus is shiny and sanitary conditions are maintained. The girls are dressed in white. The working day is not more than 6 hours and the wages are high. Each girl milks between 105 and 110 tons of milk per year. Engaged couples here are rich. Perhaps that is why we have one wedding after another."



"This demographic peculiarity must be considered during various reorganizations," states Ivan Oleksiyovych Semylit. "Here is an example from our Bashtanka. We built our own complex. This was quite expensive but the returns were hundredfold. Income from the complex amounted to 350-400 thousand rubles per year. What else could be needed? An interkolkhoz industry was created. Our complex became part of it because it was the best in the rayon. Now we also furnish there 5,000 tons of grain per year and they are supposed to fulfill our plan for meat supply. Everything seems right. But why is it that this same complex which provided us with such a high income now every year has 150 thousand rubles worth of losses. There is your meat. Moral losses should also be added. We had wonderful young people working at the complex. Now we have lost them. Moral losses brought also economic losses."

"Perhaps interkolkhoz industry works for wine production in Moldavia," states the manager of kolkhoz imeni Chkalov, Novobuz'kiy Rayon, Anatoliy Trokhymovych Popkov. "How did our interkolkhoz industrial livestock complex come about? First of all new staff was assembled but kolkhoz staff was not reduced and so we already have economic losses. The newly established organization received the best complexes. We also provide them with our feed. What do we have -- losses. Terrible losses. Why? Because workers at the interkolkhoz industry are separated from the soil. It doesn't matter to them what the harvest is. They are dependents. They aren't ready to fight for each kg of increase. What should be done? Our ministry should show flexibility here. Perhaps the complexes should be returned to the kolkhozes. In this way we will return to the state hundreds of thousands of tons of lost meat. And also millions of rubles which are lost. The young people will be returned to the village..."

"Perhaps so, it may be worthwhile to return the animal complexes to the kolkhozes, but not everywhere," states the deputy head of the department of livestock husbandry, Ukr SSR Ministry of Agriculture, Petro Ivanovych Storozhenko. "Each oblast has its peculiarities. The Ternopol area people cannot be forced to return the interfarm fattening centers back to the individual farms. The same will be true in the Ivano-Frankovsk area (although they are now transporting straw from the south of the republic!). The story is different in the steppes. There is a problem there with feed. Let's consider Bashtanka. There were two dry years, now it is flooded so that kolkhozes systematically do not provide enough feed for the interkolkhoz center. This is the start of the problem. The complex must also have feed supplies for a year or two..."

"In general, those who did not rush to set up interkolkhoz centers were better off," continues Storozhenko after a pause. "For example: Kirovograd and Cherkassy areas did not transfer their hogs to interkolkhoz care. Everything was thought out, estimated and considered. This was fair. How would you transfer to interkolkhoz care such a large and powerful complex as the one at kolkhoz imeni Lenin, Znamyanskiy Rayon; this is a violation of the farm rhythm, disregarding the experience and enthusiasm of kolkhoz experts and their pride in their work. Regardless of last year's difficult (droughty) conditions, the kolkhoz functioned well. This is characteristic. But in the Nikolaev area they obviously hurried. And now we must find an intelligent solution to the problem. We're not only concerned with

economy. The complexes are gathering places for young people. It is very important to take care of the village's future."

"...Of course, not only animal complexes hold the young people in the village," notes hero of socialist work Ivan Semenovych Derhachov, in charge of the mechanized detachment at the kolkhoz imeni Chkalov. Last year during severe drought Derhachov's detachment harvested 35.6 quintals of grain per hectare (the drought was as bad as in 1946 when only 4 quintals were harvested here, recall some people). Quite naturally, detachment members now have a broader outlook. Small wonder then that Ivan Derhachov spoke out emotionally about demographic changes in the village in a husky voice chilled by the steppe winds:

"It is right that the girls should not want to work on laborious jobs. Why should we ride modern machinery and they dig manure. Whether we want it or not, the hog tending and milkmaid's professions are morally out of date. Hence the disproportion: in the city there are too many girls and in the village there are too few. What should be done? I think that men must show some chivalry, help the girls, provide them with so-called "front" work in the village. There must be prestige connected with this work. Actually there is or can be; and not only at the complex. Let me show you some possible "front" work."

He drives his rattling machine at maximum speed; as if whatever he has to show me will break out in flames any minute.

Trees in the shelter belt flicker by. Sunflowers. Corn. We skid (there was a lot of rain here recently). Then we fly again -- black clods of earth scatter from under the wheels as if from a sling.

"Let the manager be angry with me but I will show you. It's too bad that no one sees this."

A sharp turn beyond the shelter belt, and on a broad ridge, in the steppe, in beautiful sunshine -- wormwood jungles over which the old kolkhoz orchard trees spread out their branches heavy with fruit.

The machine slows down and now we can see that the "Kal'vil'", "Symyrenka", "Boyken" and "Dzhonatan" are bright and shiny: the wormwood protects against the apple coddling moth, eradicates aphids and budworm.

"Who's here?..."

"No one!" exclaims Derhachov nervously. It's obvious that this bothers him. "Whoever wants to comes and gets the fruit. Sometimes no one comes because there is no time. You can see that there are no lazy people here. Therefore, I decided that when I retire I will come here. The boys said they won't let me. But I will come. I'll spend my days and nights here and with some retired people will take care of this."

He brakes sharply next to the pear orchard. Pyramidal dense green crowns with golden bells. But it isn't easy to get under this beauty. The ground is covered

with rosy "Panna" and "Lisovi krasuni", golden-rust "Kyure" and plump "Heneral Totleben" with cream colored "Pas-krasan" and "Dykanka". How many of these varieties rot on the trees adhering to the branches firmly. These are varieties that will never be seen in the north, near Kiev.

"This is where we lose a lot every year," notes Ivan Semenovych bitterly. "Not only here, I can't take you to the kolkhoz meadow. I can't look at it, the soil there is red with tomatoes, there is no one to pick them. This work is strictly for women but not with old methods. We need contemporary orchard-vegetable garden technology; the kind we see on the covers of agricultural magazines. We need a canning factory. Imagine being able to preserve this wealth, fill containers full of pear juice, plum and other preserves. Millions of people need this. It's for their health. I can't understand it: there is a plan for grain, meat and milk, but nothing for fruit. Why?"

We sit in the weeds enjoying a fragrant, delicately sweet "Panna" with a touch of nutmeg.

"A canning factory," muses Ivan Semenovych, "canning production lines. Automation. Girls in white smocks. A pleasant aroma over the whole village and millions in profits. But you just try mentioning this. 'You want to build a canning factory?' they will say. Better settle your accounts with Sil'hosptekhnika. Oh yes, even our economically strong kolkhoz is indebted to Sil'hosptekhnika. Why, you may ask. Because our planning organs are following bureaucratic tendencies. Wholesale prices for fertilizers, technology and building materials were raised sharply. Therefore kolkhozes are indebted to Sil'hosptekhnika which, in turn, is indebted to the factories-suppliers. And they provide neither fertilizer nor technology. A bewitched circle results. Who suffers from this? Everybody, both kolkhozes and Sil'hosptekhnika and first of all the state: we provide less than expected. For example, the kolkhozes in Novobuz'kiy Rayon owe "Sil'hosptekhnika" 37 million rubles. This is the money with which both canning factories and new complexes and highways could have been built and all of these together would yield an income 10 times higher than what we have from increased prices only. No, retail price trade tactics should not be applied to state purchasing prices. It has a serious effect on the economy. Here's another example," continues Ivan Semenovych after a pause. "We get eight rubles per quintal of grain. Later we buy it from the same procurement sources for livestock husbandry needs at 20 rubles. Who benefits by this? The state? No, it suffers losses. As a rule, we keep the animals too long, instead of fattening steer for 1 year, we keep them 2 years because we cannot always buy grain. Therefore, we provide to the state two times less the meat we should. And transportation expenses? That is why we cannot develop our 'light industry.'"

The talk moves to the office of kolkhoz manager Anatoliy Trokhymovych Popkov. Supporting fully Derhachov's thoughts about careless planning of purchasing prices, he states:

"In general, there are unexpected reserves. For example, the impossibly inflated personnel in agricultural administration. Let's see how many offices direct the farmers even in our Nikolaevskaya Oblast. First of all, there is the oblast



agricultural administration. It would seem that this might be enough. But no, there is also the 1) irrigation agriculture trust, 2) meat-milk sovkhos trust (and why?); 3) viticulture trust. And, finally, the mythical trust in Voznesensk whose functions I cannot comprehend but whose representatives travel systematically back and forth demanding some kind of papers and reports. All of these trusts are, in my opinion, superfluous. By cutting down on personnel a team of specialists could be assigned to the village and expenses saved could be used for cultural construction needed so much by the rural youth."

"Along with this," concludes the manager, "we must talk seriously about new technology. It must meet contemporary scientific-technical requirements and also consider the psychology of present-day youth, especially girls."

Even prior to this talk I learned, for example, that the Belorussian tractor builders are seriously thinking and working on the problem of the esthetic-everyday use design in machinery. At the VDNKh [Exhibit of Achievements of the People's Economy] in Moscow a few years back I had already seen samples of wheeled tractors in which cabins were furnished with the most up-to-date equipment. There were powerful air conditioners, guaranteed cabin hermetization, electronics used for driving and the machine silhouette was improved in appearance. Any girl who graduated from the 10-year school would be happy to sit in this beautiful cabin. It is unfortunate that this equipment is slow in coming to the village.

The problem of keeping girls in the village has another important aspect: it cannot be solved without help from the city. This is confirmed also by the Order of the Worker Red Flag Kiev radio factory. Here the department of ASU machine construction headed by the talented engineer-designer Oleksandr Yukhymovych Lysenko is working productively on creating robots which could take the place of thousands and thousands of girls on assembly lines. Several such robots were already constructed and have been put to work on a number of enterprises in the Ukraine.

"We are not only thinking about automating the instrument building industry," states Oleksandr Yukhymovych. "We are also thinking about the village and its future. It is no secret that our instrument building industry draws the most girls from the village. It is very easy for us to interest them: white uniforms, flowers in spacious workshops, uncomplicated (although monotonous, low production) work; beautiful dormitories and buildings of culture. But we often think: Who is left in the village -- and retired people? The village cannot live without young girls' hands, without the girls' beauty and singing, without the young mother. For this reason we are working hard on the creation of robots. We are on the threshold of a new period when we will no longer 'rob' the village, depriving it of its brides and bridegrooms."

The road through the steppe seems without end.

The highway hums under the bus wheels.

We ride dreaming about beautiful Pyatyhory where the Molochna River flows; where girls' singing may be heard and lively weddings are held.

Kirovograd - Kherson - Dnepropetrovsk - Nikolaev - Kiev.



## REGIONAL

### RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS SAID TO BE NECESSARY AT TASHKENT TELETOWER SITE

Tashkent SOVET OZBEKISTANI in Uzbek 16 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by A. Qarjavov, "High Tower"]

[Text] It is man's nature to reach for the heights. History is witness to this: the tower of Babylon, the pyramids of Egypt, the towers in the steppes of Samarkand, Bukhara and Peru, the cathedrals of Paris.... In 1889 a tower 300 meters high was erected on the grounds of the World Fair in Paris. The French engineer and builder Gustave Eiffel created it. This tower, which was a model of the technological progress of the time, was the first building constructed that made use of metal construction materials. In 1967 the 510 meter Ostankino teletower, taller than the Eiffel Tower, was put into operation in Moscow.

Nikolay Onuchin, a builder in the Leningrad construction and assembly administration 26 of the "Spetsstal'konstruktsiya" union, sat thinking about these matters in his home, and his thoughts were drawn to the construction site of the Tashkent teletower where the sectional collective of which he was now the foreman is working. The future teletower is characterized by its special beauty, its complex construction, and its durability in earthquakes. Its height is [to be] 350 meters! Seeing its depiction on the drawing board, someone compared it to a space rocket standing on its launching pad ready for take-off.

Onuchin went outside. He walked toward some fitters and welders who were installing a revolving disk at the base of the tower which was supported on three legs. They had promised to mark the new year by reaching 220 meters.

Everyone was busy with his own work at the site. Marlen Shokirov, chief of the fitter's brigade, gave an order to machinist Bogdanov. Three men took in construction pieces suspended from a line. R. Qarabov and Yu. Mel'nikov stood just on the other side of them, ready to assemble.

Looked at superficially, there is nothing complicated about this kind of work: construction pieces are brought together and fitted to one another with the help of a crane, then solidly welded, and so on. But not everyone can manage these apparently rather simple operations on a tower at an altitude of 200-300 meters. Suppose that an error of a few centimeters were made on the head section of the supporting leg. By the end of the job, this could amount to a gap of almost a meter. For this reason, its execution is always entrusted to skilled specialists who are masters at their jobs.

The fitters and welders at the construction site of the Tashkent teletower are exactly that sort of painstaking builders. Many of them have accumulated a vast prior experience working on large scale construction towers in our country. M. Tolstoy and V. Tishin actively participated in the erection of the Leningrad and Moscow teletowers. M. Shokirov, Yu. Mel'nikov and the Tsimbalyuk brothers have spread their names by assembly work on skyscrapers in a number of cities.

...Nikolay Onuchin was pleased with the work of the builders, but stressed to them the need to pay more attention to the quality of work on the night shift. He climbed high up the tower by means of the "homemade" ladder and cast a look at the section where the brigade collective led by his neighbor V. Svest'yanov was working. As in all sections of the construction site, there too the work was proceeding as desired. The tower is shooting up to the sky and constantly rising every day.

CSO: 1810

## REGIONAL

### AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AIDS ODESSA KOLKHOZ

Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 6 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Ye. Stepanenko, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Dimitrov in Tatarbunarskiy Rayon, Odesskaya Oblast: "Levels of Accomplishment"]

[Text] "In the interest of successful fulfillment of the food program, to ensure uniform planning, proportional and balanced development for the branches of the agro-industrial complex, a considerable strengthening of its material and technical base, improvements in the economic contacts between branches, the organization of efficient collaboration among them in intensifying the production of agricultural goods and improvements in the preservation, transporting, processing and delivery of such goods to the consumer."

From the plan of the CC CPSU and the 24th party congress.

Fine Ukrainian borshch. Cabbage, potatoes, beets, carrots. If you please, more than 15 components are being accumulated. This is precisely the collection of vegetables which we are cultivating in our kolkhoz garden. Is this not profitable? Judge for yourself: on the average, the profitability of vegetable growing amounted to 90 percent over a period of 5 years. Indeed, on many farms this branch either produces very little income or it operates at a loss. Ten years ago, our vegetables represented, as the saying goes, a hole in our kolkhoz pocket. A great amount of work had to be carried out in order to raise the cropping power. Compare just two figures: 24,592 and 60,250. Such were the quantities (in quintals) of vegetable crops obtained from 270 hectares in 1971 and during this past year. As you can see, the difference is substantial.

But this was not the most important factor. What was the situation earlier? The vegetable growers were of the opinion that their responsibility ended with the growing of the crops. Subsequently, large amounts of the crops disappeared -- in the fields and along the roads leading to the procurement points.

They built their own canning plant, capable of producing 1.2 million cans annually and also a freezer for 270 tons. The situation improved. But still no firm link developed between the fruit and vegetable brigade and the processing enterprise. It was at this point that the decision was made to combine the production, storage and

processing under one authority. Thus a fruit and vegetable APK (agrarno-promyshlennyy kompleks; agrarian-industrial complex) was created at the kolkhoz. Here the work was organized in the following manner: The principal portion of a crop is sold in the form of fresh products -- by means of state procurements, a portion is placed in temporary storage and the highly perishable products are processed in the canning shop.

Prior to the cultivation of vegetable plantations, the transporting of the products was carried out by our machine operators based upon orders issued to them. In essence, they were in no way responsible for the crops. With the creation of the complex, we subordinated a specialized tractor brigade to it. Horticulture and viticulture were also transferred to the APK. Thus the agrarian-industrial complex included ten subunits which earlier were independent: two specialized vegetable growing brigades, horticulture, viticulture and canning shop, a freezer and so forth. The APK became the sole master for 270 gardening hectares, 345 vineyard hectares, 155 hectares of orchards, 100 hectares of potato fields and also for subordinate industrial enterprises. The branch sectors were headed by experienced specialists: N.I. Chenkov, P.F. Dimov, D.I. Kichuk and others. The management of the complex was entrusted to an enthusiast in this work, I.M. Zlatov.

What have been the results of this reorganization of the kolkhoz? First of all -- the cropping power of the crops was raised. Even those which earlier were considered to be unsuited for production, but without which, as the saying goes, borsch is not borsch. Today we are obtaining an average of 450-500 quintals of tomatoes per hectare, 220-250 quintals of onions and no less than 100 quintals of grapes. Other hectares of land are also producing considerable increases in yields. I have already compared the gross cropping power for a decade. But, in addition, decreases occurred both in labor expenditures and in production costs. For example, compared to 1971 when 11.2 man-hours were required to produce 1 quintal of vegetables, this year -- only 6.12 man-hours.

During this same period of time, the profitability of vegetable production increased by a factor of eight. What brought this about? Success was achieved within the complex in combining the growing and processing of the products, losses were reduced to a minimum and proper use was made of non-standard vegetables and fruit. Moreover, in the final analysis maximum results were realized from production operations on the whole. For example, this year each hectare of vegetables is producing no less than 2,400 rubles of net profit. And each year the APK furnishes the kolkhoz fund with approximately 1 million rubles of net profit. Thus, from a "hole in the pocket," the kolkhoz garden has become a main source of income.

This new form of production organization has enlivened initiative. For example, take just this one fact. During the winter and spring the boiler of the canning shop lay idle. Could it not have been used during this period for heating the hothouse? The specialists estimated that sufficient heat was available. They built a winter hothouse having an area of 5,000 square meters, where they are now growing early vegetables. Hothouses under plastic appeared alongside -- their useful space is 6,000 square meters.

It bears mentioning that the specialists and all APK workers are constantly searching for the means for raising cropping power, reducing the labor-intensiveness



of the work and introducing complex mechanization. For the very first time in the oblast, the workers on the plantations have begun growing cucumbers of the Rosinka variety, sweet peppers of the Rubin variety and so forth.

There is still one other notable detail -- of a social nature. Youth are being attracted to the APK. Young men and women are willingly undertaking work in canning production and in the hothouse economy, where the working day is standard and where all of the conditions required for professional growth have been created. We have no complaint regarding a shortage of machine operators, vegetable growers or vineyard workers. The creation of the agrarian-industrial complex and its high effectiveness made it possible to employ the progressive job contract plus bonus system of labor payments. The wages for the specialists were based upon the operational results of the complex and the quantities of products obtained and sold. Thus, today everyone is interested not only in raising the cropping power of the crops but also in making complete use of everything grown, in short -- ensuring a high effectiveness for the branch.

Although vegetable growing today constitutes the principal thrust within the complex, nevertheless viticulture and horticulture are continuing to make greater contributions. We are presently reorganizing the vineyards and an industrial orchard has already commenced bearing fruit. In view of this fact, we are building a storehouse for finished products, a vegetable storehouse and a freezer for 1,000 tons. Thus, the effectiveness of the APK will increase during the next few years.

But there is one alarming fact. We are striving to grow tomatoes, onions and other crops using an industrial technology. However, it is unfortunate that effective means are not available for combating weediness, nor are sufficient machines as yet available for applying herbicides. A complete set of machines is not available for the growing of garden crops. This is delaying the conversion over to the new technology.

Equipment is not being planned for us for use in expanding the canning shop and spare parts are not being provided for the canned goods production lines. We must satisfy our requirements ourselves.

We cannot help but be alarmed by such a system. We are attempting to expand our variety of vegetable crops and to supply the consumers with fresh vegetables. For example, we offer tomatoes as early as June and yet the procurement specialists do not come to the kolkhoz at this time. And how is the acceptance of the products organized? Why must the kolkhoz transport these same tomatoes a distance of 100 kilometers to the receiving points? This is the responsibility of the procurement organizations. They tend to over-simplify their tasks: the contract is drawn up and thereafter they simply wait for the grass to grow. It is believed that this practice must be eradicated. The procurement specialists are obligated to accept the products which we grow on the spot, directly out on the fields and they must be as equally interested in the quality of the products as we are. Indeed, our common task consists of furnishing greater quantities of improved quality products and with reduced labor expenditures.

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CSO: 1800

## REGIONAL

### JAILBREAK FROM DUSHANBE TOP SECURITY PRISON

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 14 Dec 80 p 4

[Article by S. Yur'yev: "Jailbreak"]

[Text] An extraordinary incident occurred at 9:45 p.m. on 21 October 1980: four highly-dangerous felons escaped from the hard-labor prison compound in Dushanbe....

A soldier on a guard tower spotted something moving. It was hard to make out anything in the heavy dusk, but it seemed to him that figures wearing prison garb had darted across the road. The guard rang the duty officer. Within seconds the prisoner escort unit was alerted.

The four escaped prisoners did not exchange a single word as they ran. They were frightened by the clatter of their own footsteps. From time to time they would stop and listen. There was no pursuit. The strain intensified their fatigue. They slowed to a fast walk. They came to a halt by the brewery. Somebody was approaching them. Andrisov clasped with his sweat-dampened palm a knife fashioned from a hacksaw blade. The passerby was lucky. They did not arouse his suspicion....

Republic Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs M. Dzhonov, who was at home when he received the news, ordered an all-points alert. All ministry units were alerted and swung into action. Roadblocks were set up on all roads leading out of town, and checkpoints were set up at the railroad station and airport.

Up-to-date files on the escaped prisoners were placed on Mirzo Dzhonovich's desk in his office, to which he immediately returned. The ringleader was V. Andrisov, born in 1947, convicted of attempted murder of a police inspector, and resident of the town of Ordzhonikidzeabad. The others included V. Ge, born 1957, A. Yakhontov, born 1959, and S. Gasenchenko, born 1960. All had two convictions on their record....

They reached the trolleybus stop across from the Tadzhikfil'm Movie Studio. Three of them got on a trolleybus. In the brightly-lit bus interior they were as visible as fish in an aquarium.

Andrisov did not get on board. He reasoned that it was easier to catch four than one. The doors closed. The trolleybus departed. Andrisov proceeded to walk in the direction of Nagornaya Street....

Police officials informed Dzhonov of the possible reason for Andrisov's escape. The criminal had stated on numerous occasions that he would get even with the rayon public prosecutor (for the criminal indictment brought against him), his wife (she had divorced him after the trial) and with two witnesses.

It was entirely possible that Andrisov had been merely boasting. But what if he was serious? They could not rule out the possibility that he would carry out his threat. All the threatened parties were warned and given police protection...

Yakhontov, Gasenchenko and Ge, noting that Andrisov was not on board, got off the trolleybus at the first stop. In the vicinity of the heat and electric power plant they waded across the Dushanbinka and reached Koval' Street. They found an open basement door in one of the buildings on this street. They found a dry room and tried to get some sleep, but sleep would not come. They kept thinking about the treachery of Andrisov, who had abandoned them as soon as he no longer needed them. And yet he had promised them when he was getting together the escape party: "We'll break out of here. I have a lot of friends; they will help us. We'll lay low somewhere until things cool off. Then we'll head for Russia. They'll never find us there. We'll get hold of identity documents and find work...."

Andrisov walked all night. He kept tensely peering into the darkness and would carefully take cover behind bushes with the approach of auto headlights. As he was approaching a GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspection] post, he saw them stop a vehicle and proceed to examine it. He realized that the roads would be blocked. He swore. He skirted the GAI post wide, breathing heavily, and continued on his way.

He reached Ordzhonikidzeabad. Making his way down narrow alleys, where there are few passersby even during the day, he reached the house he sought. He knocked on the window. The glass pane rattled, and Andrisov took refuge behind the corner of the building: could they be lying in wait for him?

Someone was padding across the floor in bare feet. The shutters opened. A hoarse male voice asked: "Who is it?"

Andrisov replied in a loud whisper: "Are you alone, uncle?"

"Volod'ka?! Yes, I am alone."

Andrisov crept along the wall of the building and through the window. He embraced his uncle....

The headquarters staff for the search effort to hunt down the escapees was headed by M. Dzhonov, and included ministry official R. Khisamov, chief of corrective labor establishments Kh. Khatamov, prisoner escort unit commander V. Gordiyenko, and A. Ovcharenko, chief of the operations division of the Administration of Corrective Labor Establishments. Also enlisted in the effort were MVD officers, criminal investigation department and republic GAI personnel.

By morning the criminal investigation service had given them the addresses of Andrisov's relatives as well as the names and addresses of women with whom he had kept company.

On the morning of the following day Yakhontov, Gasenchenko and Ge rummaged through the basement. They found a wood-slatted storage closet. They broke it open and found cans of fruit preserves, which they proceeded to devour hungrily.

"We've got to get out of here," said Ge. "What kind of freedom is this? It's worse than solitary...."

At daybreak Andrisov was wandering through narrow, deserted alleys. When he encountered somebody, he would shield his face with his hands, lighting a cigarette. This was freedom, but what kind of freedom? He was choked with fear and hatred.

"Hey you, mister...."

Andrisov thrust his hand into his pocket, grasped the knife and turned around abruptly.

"What do you want?" He threw a piercing glance at the lad who had addressed him.

"Who are you looking for?"

"What's it to you?"

"This is the third time you've come past here."

"How would you like me to shorten your memory for you?"

The lad took a frightened step backward. Andrisov realized that this was the wrong thing to do. He attempted to smile. His face became more frightening. Yellowed teeth bared in a grin, a turned-up nose, and a hate-filled look he could not conceal. The lad took to his heels.

When it grew dark, the criminal returned to his uncle's. There was no other place he could go. He was a distant relative and perhaps nobody knew about him. He waited a long time before entering the house. He waited, looked around, and listened. It appeared that the coast was clear. He walked up to the door. He grasped the knob. He heard a soft voice say: "Here we are, Andrisov."

His shoulders drooped. Suddenly he spun around and plunged his knife into something soft. His victim seemed to expel his breath, shouting in pain. Andrisov ran toward the fence, the branches of the bare apple trees lashing his face. Behind him there was a shout: "Stop or I'll shoot! Hold it right there!"

This time he got away. He had wounded a guard supervisor from the prison. They reported back to headquarters that it was only a slight wound.

"How is the boy who tipped off the authorities?" Dzhonov inquired. "He is fine. Andrisov doesn't know anything about it."

But he did know. He surmised that the boy had followed him....

When it got dark, the other three emerged from the basement of the building at No 51 Koval' Street. It was dark, but it seemed to them that it was rather light and that anybody could recognize them.



The escaped criminals marched in silence, single file, parallel with and 20 meters to the side of the highway. They were held together not by friendship, not by ties of comradeship, but by fear. They had no plan of action to give them any hope whatsoever. A gnawing hunger was having a depressing effect on them....

Criminal investigation department officials informed Gasenchenko's father about his son's escape from prison. The old truck driver turned pale and wiped his palms as if removing crumbs. He said: "If he shows up at home, I'll truss him up and personally deliver him to you...."

Headquarters instructed that the residents of nearby villages be warned about the three escaped criminals. Since they were hungry, they would have to make their presence known. They could obtain food only by stealing it....

Yakhontov, Gasenchenko and Ge could see a village from the top of the hill they had managed to climb. The aroma of barbecued meat wafted from the direction of the village.

"When they go to sleep, we'll have to scare up something," said Yakhontov.

"Gasenchenko will go." Ge was the oldest of the three and had assumed the role of leader. Gasenchenko did not argue. It made no difference to him.

When the last light went out in the village, the three fugitives descended from the hilltop. They stopped by the fence at a house on the edge of the village. Gasenchenko proceeded on, without the slightest sense of fear. He easily got through the fence into the yard. His eyes accustomed to the darkness, he caught sight of a shed. Gasenchenko entered. Proceeding to grope about in the darkness, he came across some peas. He began stuffing them into his mouth, and then into his trouser pockets.

A door squeaked. Before he even had time to flinch, a powerful hand grabbed him by the nape of the neck. Gasenchenko struggled to free himself. His jacket split down the back. He dashed out into the yard, the bellowing householder close at his heels.

Later Gasenchenko, recalling this moment, would relate: "It was like nobody was asleep in the village. The old man started shouting, and everybody ran out into the street."

He was caught and tied up. He offered no resistance, perhaps glad to be caught. Now his wanderings were over, as was the constant fear of being caught. The most terrible thing was also over: the uncertainty of his situation. Now he would be fed. Thus ended Gasenchenko's three days of freedom. Yakhontov and Ge, hearing the shouts, fled....

Headquarters began receiving written citizen sighting reports. More than 180 of these were received! People were recognizing the escaped criminals and trying to help. Each report was checked out. And it didn't matter that none of them had yet panned out.

"Are you looking for this guy?" asked an elderly man. He poked his finger at a photograph of Andrisov which was displayed under glass by the desk sergeant at Ordzhonikidzeabad police headquarters.

"That's right."

"I know where he is. He is in hiding at my neighbor's."

"What is your neighbor's name? Address?"

The elderly man gave the information. It had to be checked out. Every lead had to be followed up. They requested of the MVD any information that they had on the person at whose home, according to the informant, Andrisov was hiding. It turned out that the person in question had a police record. They had no prior record of any contact between him and Andrisov.

"Are you sure you're not mistaken?" they asked the elderly man once more.

"He's a deadringer for the fellow in this photograph."

An arrest team drove out to the address the informant had given them. The man of the house was in the yard mending furniture. He stopped what he was doing when the strangers entered the yard.

"Who is living here with you?"

"A person on business from Moscow."

"Hey you!" they called to him. He turned around.

"What is your name?"

The fellow gave his name. He bore a striking resemblance to Andrisov, but he was about five years older. They showed him a photograph of the escaped criminal, upon which he exclaimed: "Where did you get my picture?"

In short, it was not Andrisov.

When Andrisov sensed that they were close on his heels and there was no place to hide, he decided to head for Dushanbe: a big city with a large population was a better place to hide. But even in the big city Andrisov had the feeling that everybody he passed was giving him a funny look. The criminal wound through back streets from dawn to dusk, without ever being able to relax....

The little diesel locomotive was leisurely pulling 10 or so little cars along the narrow-gauge tracks. Ge and Yakhontov were in one of the cars. They had no idea why they were headed for Kurgan-Tyube. They just wanted to keep on the move, to get as far away as possible from the vicinity of the jailbreak.

But there was a welcoming committee in Kurgan-Tyube. It was announced over the radio to all citizens in the oblast seat that the two highly-dangerous fugitives might be heading for Kurgan-Tyube. Militia officers and criminal investigation personnel made a sweep of the entire town.

Ge and Yakhontov could feel that their pursuers were closing in. Their freedom had proven to be not so wonderful as their imagination had pictured it back in prison. They had eaten only three times in six days. They had slept wherever they happened to be at the time. Each one was mentally cursing himself for this ill-considered act. It had failed to bring them the joy they had expected. And their prospects now were gloomy indeed.

That night they were arrested while hiding in the attics of two houses. Gaunt and unshaven, Ge and Yakhontov had neither the strength nor will to resist capture....

Going through the list of Andrisov's possible contacts, Col R. Khisamov and prison commandant Maj S. Kamolov came across the name of a person in Dushanbe who had been a fellow convict of Andrisov during his first prison term. They put a stakeout on the building in which he was living. During the day they made discrete inquiries with the building tenants. It was confirmed that a person matching Andrisov's description had been seen.

That evening the deputy minister said: "Well, Salakhutdin Kamolovich, he is your fugitive, so you should be the one to make the arrest."

Kamolov was accompanied to the suspect location by Maj N. Pyatikov, deputy chief of the operations sections of the MVD Directorate of Corrective Labor Establishments, and two warrant officers from the prisoner escort unit.

Andrisov was in a good humor. Tired out from being on the run, he lay sprawled out on the sofa, feeling relaxed and safe at last. The apartment's tenant was cooking supper and advising him on his future course of action.

The doorbell rang. Neither of them suspected a thing. The possible link between them was too remote. Andrisov's friend walked over to the door and opened it. Kamolov and Pyatikov entered. The fugitive did not even budge. Suddenly the lights went out. Kamolov, although heavily built, bounded over to the light switch and turned the lights back on.

"What's your name?" Pyatikov asked, pointing his pistol at Andrisov.

"Sidorov," the latter replied.

Kamolov smiled. He knew all of his convicts by sight.

"Sidorov, my eye," said Salakhutdin. "And don't try anything funny."

I interviewed the recaptured fugitives. Three of them were really devastated. The few days of so-called freedom would result in several years being tacked on to their sentences.

I felt human compassion for these boys, who were barely in their twenties. Their eyes were sad, devoid of spark, and their shoulders drooped in abject submission. It is not easy to make a break with the criminal life. This requires first and foremost that one learn to resist the Andrisovs.

## REGIONAL

### CENTRAL ASIAN POPULATION GROWTH STUDIED IN TASHKENT

Tashkent OZBEKISTAN MADANIYATI in Uzbek 14 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by D. Niyazov, docent at Tashkent State University imeni Lenin, "Scientific Seminar"]

[Text] In recent years considerable scientific work concerning demography has been conducted in our country. In terms of its demographic progress Central Asia occupies a fundamental position in our Union.

Great attention is being paid now to the growth, education, and professional placement of its population. That's why problems such as expanding scientific institutions, preparing specialists and assuring them a future, hold an important place in our republic. Especially since the preparation of national cadres is one of the fundamental problems in Central Asian republics, a laboratory for the scientific study of population growth was established in 1972 at Tashkent State University imeni Lenin with this in mind. This laboratory is operating successfully.

The laboratory is conducting a study on the topic "Regional Demographic Policy and the Problem of Central Asian Population Growth." For example, what will the population of Uzbekistan be at the beginning of the XXI century? What part of the population will live in cities? It is also conducting research on a number of problems like birth and marriage rates in our republic. For instance, what level will national education attain by the year 2,000? Demographers are grappling with such problems.

Several all-union seminars and scientific conferences on population growth have been held in our republic. And on-the-job-training practicum composed of honors students from Asia, Africa and Latin America has been formed. Consequently, their visit to the progressive republics of Central Asia which in the past had been backward is edifying and interesting.

Workers at the laboratory for the scientific study of population growth pursue their work in constant cooperation with plants and factories. Laboratory workers carry out their research work in organic cooperation with scholars and scientific workers of the Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov, of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Middle Special Education, and of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR.

Just yesterday an expanded assembly of the presidium of the population growth section of the scientific and technological council of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Middle Special Education was held in Tashkent. A number of complex problems concerning this field was examined at the seminar.

CSO: 1810



## REGIONAL

### SOUTHERN AZERI WRITER INTERVIEWED IN BAKU

Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri 5 Sep 80 p 6

[Interview with Rahim Dagig: "He Appreciates Us, Too"]

[Text] Across from us sits a white-haired man. He is talking animatedly. We also feel this from his movements, sometimes catching a glimmer of joy, sometimes of sorrow. Somehow, we become excited also. Our conversation with the Southern Azeri writer and journalist Rahim Dagig begins this way.

"Rahim, first we want to know if you would introduce yourself to our readers."

"In order to make it clear, we have to go back in time."

"Go ahead."

"As you know, at the beginning of our century a lot of workers from different parts of Iran came to Baku looking for work. My father was one of them. He left a village near Urmiye in 1900, came to Baku and began working in the Sultan Bey mines.

I am basically from Baku. I was born in 1919 in old Chambarakkandi and received my primary education in Baku. I completed my studies at the Oil Industry Technical School in 1937. I wrote my first 3-act play in Baku—"This, then, is such...." The first readers and published writers who read that work were the late Abdulla Shaig and our beloved poet Suleyman Rustam.

In 1939 fate brought our family back to Iran again. There we had a number of difficulties, the major one of which was to find work. One day, after a lot of running around, the head of the Tabriz Darulfunun looked at my diploma, got angry, and said: "What is this? You, the son of a worker, finished the Baku Technikum with grades of 'excellent' and 'good'!"

Having said this, he tore up my diploma.

In those years those returning from military service in Iran found it relatively easy to find work. So I was compelled to go into the army. There I saw the kind of tyranny the soldiers were subjected to, and I was terrified. I tried to express the anger and repugnance I felt in my heart in my story "We must put an end

to this." Somewhat later I created a drama group under the auspices of the labor union in Tehran and there I staged my first play. My play "Free Azad" was staged with the participation of students in the final course of the Baku Theater Technicum which was in Tehran in 1945 and under the direction of Ali Shinasai who was a student friend of USSR Peoples Artist Mehdi Mammadov. In general there was significant activity in the realm of literature and fine arts in Southern Azerbaijan in 1945-1946. In the course of a year, hundreds of talents emerged. It is a great pity that after breaking up the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic the Shahist regime, with the help of foreign imperialism, further strengthened its black reactionary elements."

"We would like you to give us some information on Southern Azeri literature in the years leading up to the Islamic revolution in Iran."

"After 1946 thousands of talented youths were seized and arrested, and their work was lost to the fatherland. Among these there were many writers and artists. Those remaining in peace were intellectually killed, because to write and speak in the mother tongue was forbidden. Very often we turned weddings and funerals into literary gatherings and we read our poems and stories in Azeri. In this and other ways Southern Azeri literature did not cease its creative process. Your readers know this from the works of Shahriyar, Sahand and others of our poets and writers who were published here. In these years the people heard the voices of sons and daughters of Southern Azerbaijan like Samad Bahrangi, Marziya Uskuhi, Alirza Okhtay and Behruz Dehgani. The four of them were victims of the Shahist regime. The Pahlavi reactionary did not forgive Samad Bahrangi for his wandering through each village of Southern Azerbaijan collecting folklore, distributing books to village children and teaching them the alphabet. They imprisoned his sister, the teacher and poetess Marziya Uskuhi, and inflicted unbelievable tortures on her for her ways of thinking. The fate of progressive sons and daughters of Azerbaijan and other peoples of Iran was similar. Once Karimpur Shirazi, an editor of the newspaper SHURISH, sharply criticized the Shah's regime. One day, in the reception room of the palace, the Shah's sister Ashraf said to her brother: "I have a good present for you." After these words they brought Karimpur Shirazi, his hands and feet shackled, into the room. Ashraf, with her own hand, poured oil on the powerful journalist and lit it. The people in the room laughed as they watched Karimpur Shirazi burning and writhing until he passed out. Agents of SAVAK shot another journalist, Mahammad Mas'ud, who had spoken out against the Shah's tyranny, one day at noon. In Iran the fate of poets, writers, journalists and artists of conscience of all nationalities was tragic in the period of rule of the Pahlavi dynasty. The Islamic Revolution brought down Shahism which hung like a sword over the heads of the peoples of Iran for 2500 years and put an end to the Pahlavi dynasty which was one of its most ruthless representatives. The defender of this dynasty backed Iran with the force of American imperialism. Under the new constitution of Iran everyone is allowed to publish in their native tongue. They are allowed to study in their mother tongue up to the 5th class."

"At the first meeting in March of last year in Tehran, held to establish a writers and poets association of Azerbaijan a discussion on writing textbooks in Azeri was held. You were one of the participants in that meeting. We would like to know what the current status of the question of writing textbooks in the Azeri language is and how this opportunity is being exploited?"

"First I have to say that the creation of newspapers and journals like YOLDASH, VARLYG, JANLIBEL, AZARBAIJAN and ULDUZ are especially connected with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. My pen colleagues, Huseyn Duzgun, Mahammad Farzana, Salamullah Javid, Ganjali Sabahi, Yahya Sheyda, Hashym Tarlan Urnuoghlu, Majidzada Savalan, Turkoghlu, Darafshi, Ashrafi, Ibrahimi, Valeh, Aziz Mohsin and others, who have kept their words to themselves for years, now have found the opportunity to express themselves. It is clear that the kind of press we publish is not the same as yours. You have a given right to print the works you do; with us it is different. Certain people gather together and we put out newspapers and magazines with our own money. Printing is especially difficult. We have no compositors for Azeri. Thus, in turn we all compile the newspapers and magazines at the printers. Despite all this every sentence composed in Azeri gives us endless delight. When it comes to the question of textbooks our scholarly friends and writers like Dr Javad Hey'at, the editor of "Varlyg," and Dr Hamid Nitgi, Khameneyi and Pirhashimi have already prepared a number of textbooks. Because the internal situation in Iran has still not stabilized itself these will not be used in this school year. We are sure that this question will be positively resolved in the future."

"You saw Soviet Azerbaijan 40 years ago. What is your impression of it now?"

"First I'd like to talk about the unparalleled changes I've seen in Baku, the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan. I used to think of Baku as the "city of winds." Now, however, it is a city of flowers. There is a north wind and a south wind, but there is no trace of the dirt and dust on the streets which used to blow into peoples' eyes. I enjoy the high buildings along the wide asphalt boulevards. Now, a number of Baku suburbs have been united. It is hard to believe that you can travel only a short time on the subway and get off at the suburb of Razin. I feel that the growth of the scientific and cultural centers in the city are a result of raising the cultural level of the people. Peoples' faces are more open and joyful than in the past.

I am interested in the life and works of our great playwright M. F. Akhundov. For a number of years I have been working on a book called "Who Is Akhundov?" I used the opportunity and went to Shaki, the native city of the writer, and, on the road, I saw and appreciated the changes I saw in Baku. We are following, of course, the success of Soviet Azerbaijan, especially in the realms of literature and the fine arts. In recent years the echoes of the major steps you have taken have reached us and we appreciate them. We are glad that word about Azerbaijan is being voiced more in different parts of the world. I am very glad that I saw with my own eyes men building a stimulating life once again."

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## REGIONAL

### BRIEFS

UZBEKISTAN LONG LIFE EXPECTANCY--Over the years of the Soviet regime the median life expectancy rate in Uzbekistan has increased by more than two times and has reached 70 years--according to statistics. But the best illustration of this is perhaps, as an example, the kolkhoz imeni Akhunbabayev in the Namanganskiy rayon. More than 200 people between the ages of 80 and 85 are now living here. Veterans at the kolkhoz enjoy the great attention and respect of their countrymen. They are also aware of the constant concern of the kolkhoz management which strives to create for them restful surroundings and all the conditions for participation in public activities. All the veterans receive pensions. Homes are built for them. The kolkhoz has created a special rest area for them. In the picture: (from left to right) Mirkamol Saidov, Abduzhabbor Kakharov and Mamasadyk Dzhurayev. All of them have something to remember. They have traveled a long and complex road side by side. Together they installed the Soviet regime in their native village, participated in collectivization, and defended the achievements of the October revolution during the Great Patriotic War. These people have had a complex life of work, which has assured them a secure old age. The oldest of the friends is Mirkamol Saidov, who was 86 years old this year. [Photograph by Kh. Khaydarov and R. Shagayev with caption by Uzbek Telegraphic Agency] [Text] [Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 22 Nov 80 p 4]

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